[Nettime-bold] (Fwd) point of view by military strategist

["Ivo Skoric" <ivo@reporters.net>]

so - if we just send people to remove landmines - we would all be 
declared martyrs by Taliban - in which case this entire war would 
not be happening...
ivo

------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
From:           	IMartinac@aol.com
Date sent:      	Mon, 8 Oct 2001 04:08:50 EDT
Subject:        	point of view by military strategist
To:             	IMartinac@aol.com

Dear friends,
As the US and UK started to bomb Afghanistan, this was forwarded to me from 
Canada....I think it offers a very valuable point of view....it answers 
questions of the type "what exactly should we do"...

Love,
Peace,
Ida
________________________________________


This letter was forwarded to me from Germany by a US Army friend who's 
been stationed in Europe for several years.  It was written by an 
extremely well-informed West Point graduate who has extensive experience 
on the ground in Afghanistan.  I think it's worth a read.  
Stu Miller
_____________________________________________________________
CLASSMATES:

Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of the last American 
citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan.  I was first 
there in 1993, providing relief and assistance to refugees along the 
Tajik border, and in this capacity have traveled all along the border 
region between the two countries.  In 1998 and 1999, I was the Deputy 
Program Manager for the UN's mine action program in Afghanistan.  This 
program is the largest civilian employer in the country with over 5,000 
persons clearing mines and UXO.  In this later capacity, I was somewhat 
ironically engaged in a "Holy War," as decreed by the Taliban, against 
the evil of landmines; and by a special proclamation of Mullah Omar, all 
those who might have died in this effort were considered to be "martyrs" 
-- even an "infidel" like myself.   The mine action program is the most 
respected relief effort in the country, and because of this I had the 
opportunity to travel extensively without too much interference or 
restriction.  I still have extensive contacts in the area and among the 
Afghan community and read a great deal on the subject.  I had wanted to 
write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but quite frankly, I 
have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and have not had time.  
Dr. Tony Kern's comments were excellent and I would like to use them as a 
basis for sharing some observations.

First, he is absolutely correct.  This war is about will, resolve and 
character.  I want to touch on that later, but first I want to share some 
comments about our "enemy."  Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan.  
The country is devastated beyond what most of us can imagine. The vast 
majority of the people live day-to-day, hand-to-mouth in abject 
conditions of poverty, misery and deprivation.  Less than 30% of the men 
are literate, the women even less.  The country is exhausted, and 
desperately wants something like peace. They know very little of the 
world at large, and have no access to information or knowledge that would 
counter what they are being told by the Taliban.  They have nothing left, 
nothing that is except for their pride.

Who is our enemy?  Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often 
referred to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a fanatical group of religious 
leaders and their military cohort, the Taliban.  The non-Afghan 
contingent came from all over the Islamic world to fight in the war 
against the Russians. Many came using a covert network created with 
assistance by our own government.  OBL (as Osama bin Laden was referred 
to by us in the country at the time) restored this network to bring in 
more fighters, this time to support the Taliban in their civil war 
against the former Mujehdeen. Over time, this military support along with 
financial support has allowed OBL and his "Arabs" to co-opt significant 
government activities and leaders. OBL is the "inspector general" of 
Taliban armed forces; his bodyguards protect senior Talib leaders and he 
has built a system of deep bunkers for the Taliban, which were designed 
to withstand cruise missile strikes (uhm, where did he learn to do 
that?).  His forces basically rule the southern city of Kandahar.

This high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2 
years or so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part 
of the local Afghans.  At the same time, the legitimacy of the Taliban 
regime has started to decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local 
humanitarian conditions have worsened and as "cultural" restrictions have 
become even harsher.  It is my assessment that most Afghans no longer 
support the Taliban.  Indeed the Taliban have recently had a very 
difficult time getting recruits for their forces and have had to rely 
more and more on non-Afghans, either from Pushtun tribes in Pakistan or 
from OBL.  OBL and the Taliban, absent any US action, were probably on 
their way to sharing the same fate that all other outsiders and outside 
doctrines have experienced in Afghanistan -- defeat and dismemberment.

During the Afghan war with the Soviets, much attention was paid to the 
martial prowess of the Afghans.  We were all at West Point at the time, 
and most of us had high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would all 
want to go help the brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle against 
the Soviets.  Those concepts were naive to the extreme.  The Afghans, 
while never conquered as a nation, are not invincible in battle.  A 
"good" Afghan battle is one that makes a lot of noise and light.  Basic 
military skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural constraints that 
no matter what, a warrior should never lose his honor.  Indeed, firing 
from the prone is considered distasteful (but still done).  
Traditionally, the Afghan order of battle is very feudal in nature, with 
fighters owing allegiance to a "commander," and this person owing 
allegiance upwards and so on and so on.  Often such allegiance is secured 
by payment.  And while the Taliban forces have changed this somewhat, 
many of the units in the Taliban army are there because they are being 
paid to be there.  All such groups have very strong loyalties along 
ethnic and tribal lines.  Again, the concept of having a place of "honor" 
and "respect" is of paramount importance and blood feuds between families 
and tribes can last for generations over a perceived or actual slight.  
That is one reason why there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen fighting the 
Russians.  It is a very difficult task to form and keep united a large 
bunch of Afghans into a military formation.  The "real" stories that have 
come out of the war against the Soviets are very enlightening and a lot 
different from our
fantastic visions as cadets.   

When the first batch of Stingers came in and were given to one Mujehdeen 
group, another group -- supposedly on the same side -- attacked the first 
group and stole the Stingers, not so much because they wanted to use 
them, but because having them was a matter of prestige.  Many larger 
coordinated attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed when all the 
various Afghan fighting groups would give up their assigned tasks (such 
as blocking or overwatch) and instead would join the assault group in 
order to seek glory.    

In comparison to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the rate of 
fatalities were lower for all involved.  As you can tell from above, it 
is my assessment that these guys are not THAT good in a purely military 
sense and the "Arabs" probably even less so than the Afghans.  So why is 
it that they have never been conquered?  It goes back to Dr. Kern's point 
about will.  During their history, the only events that have managed to 
form any semblance of unity among the Afghans, is the desire to fight 
foreign invaders.  And in doing this, the Afghans have been fanatical.  
The Afghans' greatest military strength is the ability to endure 
hardships that would, in all probability, kill most Americans and 
enervate the resolve of all but the most elite military units. The 
physical difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, the 
weather, and the harshness are all weapons that our enemies will use to 
their advantage and use well.  (NOTE: For you military planner types and 
armchair generals: around November 1st, most road movement is impossible, 
in part because all the roads used by the Russians have been destroyed 
and air movement will be problematic at best).  Also, those fighting us 
are not afraid to fight.  OBL and others do not think the US has the will 
or the stomach for a fight.  Indeed after the absolutely inane missile 
strikes of 1998, the overwhelming consensus was that we were cowards who 
would not risk one life in face-to-face combat.  Rather than 
demonstrating our might and acting as a deterrent, that action and others 
of the not so recent past, have reinforced the perception that the US 
does not have any "will" and that we are morally and spiritually corrupt. 
 Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their 
propensity for internal struggles, the distrust between the 
extremists/Arabs and the majority of Afghans, their limited ability to 
fight coordinated battles, and their lack of external support.  More 
importantly through is that we have to take steps not to play to their 
strengths, which would be to unite the entire population against us by 
increasing their suffering or killing innocents, to get bogged down 
trying to hold terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition chasing up 
and down mountain valleys.

I have been asked how I would fight the war.  This is a big question and 
well beyond my pay grade or expertise.  And while I do not want to second 
guess current plans or start an academic debate, I would share the 
following from what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans.   First, I 
would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they can buy 
off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter.  Second, also with this 
cash, I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban leadership, 
making it look like an inside job to spread distrust and build on 
existing discord.  Third I would support the Northern alliance with 
military assets, but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as to
undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans.  Fourth would be to 
give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghans in 
Pakistan in order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give these guys a 
reason to live rather than the choice between dying of starvation or 
dying fighting the "infidel."  Fifth, start a series of public works 
projects in areas of the country not under Taliban control (these are 
much more than the press reports) again to demonstrate goodwill and that 
improvements come with peace.  Sixth, I would consider very carefully 
putting any female service members into Afghanistan proper -- sorry to 
the females of our class but within that culture a man who allows a women 
to fight for him has zero respect, and we will need respect to gain the 
cooperation of Afghan allies. No Afghan will work with a man who fights 
with women. I would hold off from doing anything too dramatic in the new 
term, keeping a low level of covert action and pressure up over the 
winter, allowing this pressure to force open the fissions around the 
Taliban that were already developing -- expect that they will quickly 
turn on themselves and on OBL.

We can pick up the pieces next summer, or the summer after.  When we do 
"pick up" the pieces, I would make sure that we do so on the ground, "man 
to man."  While I would never want to advocate American causalities, it 
is essential that we communicate to OBL and all others watching that we 
can and will "engage and destroy the enemy in close combat."  As 
mentioned above, we should not try to gain or hold terrain, but Infantry 
operations against the enemy are essential.  There can be no excuses 
after the defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our enemies 
regarding American resolve and nothing, nothing will communicate this 
except for ground combat.   

And once this is all over, unlike in 1989, the US must provide continued 
long-term economic assistance to rebuild the country.  While I have 
written too much already, I think it is also important to share a few 
things on the subject of brutality.  Our opponents will not abide by the 
Geneva conventions.  There will be no prisoners unless there is a chance 
that they can be ransomed or made part of a local prisoner exchange.  
During the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist 
prisoners having their throats slit.  Indeed, there did exist a "trade" 
in prisoners so that souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to take 
home with them.  This practice has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and 
Chechnya where similar videos are being made today and can be found on 
the web for those so inclined.  We can expect our soldiers to be treated 
the same way.  Sometime during this war I expect that we will see videos 
of US prisoners having their heads cut off.   

Our enemies will do this not only to demonstrate their "strength" to 
their followers, but also to cause us to overreact, to seek wholesale 
revenge against civilian populations, and to turn this into the 
world-wide religious war that they desperately want.  This will be a test 
of our will and of our character. (For further corroboration of this type 
of activity please read Kipling). This will not be a pretty war; it will 
be a war of wills, of resolve and somewhat conversely of compassion and 
of a character.  Towards our enemies, we must show a level of 
ruthlessness that has not been part of our military character for a long 
time.  But to those who are not our enemies we must show a level of 
compassion probably unheard of during war.  We should do this not for 
humanitarian reasons, even though there are many, but for shrewd military 
logic.

For anyone who is still reading this way too long note, thanks for your 
patience.  I will try to answer any questions that may arise in a more 
concise manner.
  
Thanks,  Richard Kidd

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