adrian buchster on Mon, 3 Dec 2001 18:21:02 +0100 (CET) |
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[Nettime-bold] FWD: A few words regarding freedom of expression |
Maybe this can be of interest (sorry if you already know about the ongoing polemic) AB Subject: A few words regarding freedom of expression Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2001 11:28:15 -0500 From: sawad <sawad@utensil.net> Organization: utensil References: 1 I don't claim to have at hand a motivation for 01.org's hacking of the Korean Web Art exhibition, but I would like to say a few words. As Marc has already suggested, the action exhibits a clear disrespect for the work of fellow participants. Supposing (perhaps wrongly) that in an exhibition such as this one each work and its artist(s) participates implicitly in an agreement to respect the principle of freedom of expression, 01.org's aggression indicates a disregard for this principle. One may argue that 01.org's misprision carries "freedom of expression" to its logical conclusion. This is indeed the sort of quandary within which legal systems aware of democratic ideals often find themselves. However, it would help sort some if this entanglement -- or at least help us see why it is we are so entangled -- if we are more attentive to some distinctions (and confusions) between actions and representations. While it has been argued (for example, by the late British philosopher J.L. Austin, and, subsequently, by a number of "postmodern" writers) that representations "do things," that they affect us, they incite, and so forth, no one can really furnish an explanation of HOW a representation actually carries out such work. At least in the case of a computer program there is an algebraic representation of a machine made of language designed to be "interpreted" (through a system of physical or electronic triggers) by a machine made of physical parts -- however small these days. Since before Shelley's Frankenstein and Babbage's Difference Engine, including latter-day postmodern theories of representation, we have effectively confused action and representation. This confusion has been productive, but I have chosen to argue that the confusion has been built upon a metaphorical agency (mis)taken for an actual one. In other words, the proposition that representations have agency attempts! to explain something that we probably don't understand very well - how "knowledge" is acquired and made "useful," how we are "affected" by representations. Our language about what language "does" -- if anything at all -- is really quite limited. Instead, we habitually say that it "affects" us, that it "does" things, and so forth, drawing on metaphors of physicality and causality which we imagine we understand simply because our bodies seemingly operate upon, as well as are affected by physical substances. In other words, to accord agency to language is to project a physical model onto a symbolic artifact which is not properly material and yet is seemingly "sensible" everywhere. Perhaps there is something valuable to be gained by listening to those writers who argue that language is "nothing," alluding to a non-beingness that is all the more valuable as "it" seems so elusiveness, difficult to "grasp." By drawing attention to the metaphorical agency of representation, I wish to point out its distinction from other forms of action, or from the representation of action. To be sure, to do something, to effect the physical world, we may actually invoke representations, but it is not necessarily the case that representations do things on their own. Even theater is not simply action, as Artaud understood. To represent a murder is not necessarily to murder someone. This difference suggests with regard to a theory about expressive freedom that "expression" -- which is itself a metaphorical representation of substance ejected from within our bodies -- is that which remains metaphorical and precisely short of action beyond the work necessary for its production. It doesn't mean that action cannot and does not accompany expression, but that whenever such excess action accompanies expression it must be entertained differently from metaphoricity or expressivity. It cannot be described as "free" or "nothing." A relevant example from art history comes to mind which may help illustrate the points I've tried to make above about action and representation, as well as to further reflect upon our being hacked by 01.org. When bad boy Rauschenberg's erased de Kooning's drawing to produce his own Erased de Kooning he asked de Kooning for a drawing and proceeded to erase it, leaving the sort of smeared marks one associates with pencil being rubbed out with a rubber eraser. One can still identify the paths of faint and distorted markings characteristic of certain other drawings by de Kooning. Rauschenberg's negative gesture sheds light on originality and creativity, as well as on productivity, appropriation, and value. But it seems particularly relevant for us to note that it also very much respects (artistic) work and identity. The fact that he asked de Kooning for one of his drawings is already evidence of a willingness on the part of Rauschenberg to engage the senior action painter on the level of representation rather than simply in terms of actions. Furthermore, Rauschenberg chose to solicit a work from an artist with repute -- I know of no existence of an erased "Jasper Johns." Indeed, Johns, like Rauschenberg, was a figure whose prominence, not to mention significance, was still emerging when Rauschenberg performed his "destructive" deed. But in erasing the de Kooning drawing he did not simply destroy it. The material of the drawing became Rauschenberg's, but the work became an homage to de Kooning, bearing the latter's name (as well as ghostly markings), even in the wake of the younger artist's bombastic appropriative gesture. Rauschenberg's artifact remains in effect a seal of respect (in all senses), signed (by de Kooning) and countersigned (by Rauschenberg), perhaps even of admiration, he had for the work and identity of the other artist. Like all art, the Erased de Kooning gestures toward negating representation, but it is also affirmative of as well as responsive to the work of others. Best regards, Sawad _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp _______________________________________________ Nettime-bold mailing list Nettime-bold@nettime.org http://amsterdam.nettime.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nettime-bold