John Armitage on Mon, 18 Mar 2002 20:10:02 +0100 (CET)


[Date Prev] [Date Next] [Thread Prev] [Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]

[Nettime-bold] Hans-Georg Gadamer, 1900-2002



Hans-Georg Gadamer German philosopher who studied with Heidegger but developed the theory that
language, not time and culture, determines consciousness 
Julian Roberts
Guardian 
Monday March 18, 2002

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4376113,00.html 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, who has died in Heidelberg aged 102, was one of the
outstanding figures of German 20th-century philosophy. He was not just
astonishingly long-lived, but his frenetic philosophical activity continued
until his death. 
Gadamer only came to prominence as a philosopher with the publication of
Truth And Method in 1960; and his role is best seen as part of the postwar
rehabilitation of German philosophy. 
His career reflected the times in which he lived. Born in Marburg, the son
of a chemistry professor, he chose to study philosophy despite the political
and economic mayhem of inter-war Germany, taking his doctorate with Martin
Heidegger in Marburg in 1929. Heidegger remained the formative influence on
Gadamer's thinking. 
When the Nazis took power in 1933, he still had no job. Unlike Heidegger,
Gadamer never joined the Nazi party, and (perhaps because of the polio he
had contracted as a student) was able to avoid all military commitments.
Nevertheless, the Nazis forced him, as they did all surviving academics, to
jump through various more or less degrading hoops (notably at "camps" for
members of the National-Socialist Lecturers' Club). 
In 1934, Gadamer taught briefly at the University of Kiel, then a well-known
Nazi stronghold. In 1937, he became professor in Marburg, and two years
later in Leipzig. After the war ended, the Soviets made him rector of
Leipzig University, but in 1947 he moved back to Frankfurt and then finally
to Heidelberg in 1949, where he remained, unmarried, until his death. 
Academic philosophy in 20th-century Germany falls into two distinct phases.
The first half of the century was fascinated by the idea of reason as
something historical. It was to be understood not as some neutral
instrument, equally available to all thinking creatures, and subject to
universal rules accessible to all, but as being rooted in the particular
circumstances of time or culture. Heidegger's celebrated notion of Dasein
(existence, but - literally - "being here") was a revolt against the
"analytical" traditions of the late 19th century and the thought that the
truths described by philosophy were indifferently available to all people,
whether "here" (that is, part of this culture) or not. 
Such notions were appropriated by unsavoury political operators. Heidegger
was, at least initially, content for his historicist existentialism to flow
into the new political establishment's nationalism and racism. 
After the second world war, it was clear that German academic philosophy and
its historicist existentialism were seriously compromised. One (still
continuing) response to this was a widespread revival of analytical and
natural law traditions. Another was a resurgence of Marxism. A third was the
attempt to rescue historicism by cleansing it of the nasty political flavour
it had acquired during the dictatorship. 
The theory of "hermeneutics" which Gadamer developed in Truth And Method is
part of this third project. In it, he withdraws from the extreme standpoint
of prewar existentialism - that Being is fixed by historical and cultural
circumstance, replacing this ontological radicalism with a theory of
language. For him, Being is not constituted as such by race and nationality,
but, in a celebrated dictum: "Being that can be understood is language." If
I have no word for something, it does not "exist" for me, so existence, or
failure to exist, happens within language. Without language, there is no
understanding, and language is a product of history and culture. 
According to Gadamer, language is a historical phenomenon for two reasons.
One is practical. Language is about communication. It is about transferring,
aggregating and processing information. The ability of language to perform
these functions depends on the skill with which its users understand each
other in any particular case. Language determines consciousness; and this
determination depends on how well people have communicated. So:
"hermeneutics", for Gadamer, means "understanding" in this concrete sense. 
One aspect of this, for his own work, was a renewed emphasis on rhetoric as
the discipline of making language function in practice. Another aspect is
his famous model of reasoning as dialogue. Language's second historical
characteristic is that it articulates cultural identities. 
Gadamer shares the existentialist suspicion of projects which purport to
determine truths and values by means of abstract calculation. As far as
values are concerned, we inevitably start off in the historical "here" in
some way we cannot further analyse. In that respect, as Gadamer argues,
valuative (moral or artistic) judgments are quite properly "prejudices" (
Vor-urteile , "pre-judgments"). This is not a bad thing, for, as long as we
recognise what is happening, we can start to engage in the hermeneutic
dialogue which language offers to us, and so overcome the limitations of our
own starting position and move towards a richer understanding of ourselves
and others. 
Typically, this takes place in more or less formalised hermeneutic
"dialogues" which strive to reconcile inconsistent valuative positions.
Major examples would be discussion about the value of works of art, and the
legal discourse of the courtroom. 
Gadamer's theories bore most philosophical fruit in the 60s and 70s, not
least in exchanges with other "linguistic" theories such as that of J|rgen
Habermas. Subsequently, Gadamer's academic influence has become largely
confined to the cultural disciplines; in Germany itself, the predominant
analytical tone has now more or less extinguished philosophical historicism.

As far as the overcoming of the past is concerned, it must also be said that
(despite his own interest in the 18th century), Gadamer never developed any
understanding for what may well be the best remedy for nasty philosophy -
namely the empiricism represented at that time by David Hume. 
7 Hans-Georg Gadamer, philosopher, born February 11 1900; died March 14 2002


_______________________________________________
Nettime-bold mailing list
Nettime-bold@nettime.org
http://amsterdam.nettime.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nettime-bold