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| <nettime> CTHEORY Interview with Paul Virilio |
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Sent: 18/10/00 20:13
Subject: Article 89 - CTHEORY Interview with Paul Virilio
_____________________________________________________________________
CTHEORY THEORY, TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE VOL 23, NO 3
Article 89 18-10-00 Editors: Arthur and Marilouise Kroker
_____________________________________________________________________
CTHEORY Interview with Paul Virilio:
The Kosovo War Took Place in Orbital Space
==========================================
~Paulo Virilio in Conversation with John Armitage~
~Translated by Patrice Riemens~
---------------------------------------------------
Paul Virilio is a renowned urbanist, political theorist and critic of
the art of technology. Born in Paris in 1932, Virilio is best known
for his 'war model' of the growth of the modern city and the
evolution of human society. He is also the inventor of the term
'dromology' or the logic of speed. Identified with the phenomenology
of Merleau-Ponty, the futurism of Marinetti and technoscientific
writings of Einstein, Virilio's intellectual outlook can usefully be
compared to contemporary architects, philosophers and cultural
critics such as Bernard Tschumi, Gilles Deleuze and Jean Baudrillard.
Virilio is the author, among other books, of _Bunker Archeology_
(1994 [1975]), _Speed & Politics: An Essay on Dromology_ (1986
[1977]), _The Information Bomb_ (2000 [1998]) and, most recently,
_Strategie de la deception_ (1999). His analysis of the Kosovo War is
the subject of his conversation with John Armitage below.
*John Armitage*: Professor Virilio, to what extent does your
intellectual and artistic work on the architecture of war, and
architecture more generally, inform your thinking in _Strategie de la
deception_? Is it the case that, in common with other so-called
'postmodern' wars, such as the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the
architecture of war, along with architecture itself, is
'disappearing'? How did you approach the question of the architecture
of war and its disappearance in _Strategie de la deception_?
*Paul Virilio*: Well, let me put it this way, I have always been
interested in the architecture of war, as can be seen in _Bunker
Archeology_. However, at the time that I did the research for that
book, I was very young. My aim was to understand the notion of 'Total
War'. As I have said many times before, I was among the first people
to experience the German Occupation of France during the Second World
War. I was 7-13 years old during the War and did not really
internalise its significance. More specifically, under the
Occupation, we in Nantes were denied access to the coast of the
Atlantic Ocean. It was therefore not until after the War was over
that I saw the sea for the first time, in the vicinity of St Nazaire.
It was there that I discovered the bunkers. But what I also
discovered was that, during the War, the whole of Europe had become a
fortress. And thus I saw to what extent an immense territory, a whole
continent, had effectively been reorganised into one city, and just
like the cities of old. From that moment on, I became more interested
in urban matters, in logistics, in the organisation of transport, in
maintenance and supplies.
But what is so astonishing about the war in Kosovo for me is that it
was a war that totally bypassed territorial space. It was a war that
took place almost entirely in the air. There were hardly any Allied
armed personnel on the ground. There was, for example, no real state
of siege and practically no blockade. However, may I remind you that
France and Germany were opposed to a maritime blockade of the
Adriatic Sea without a mandate from the United Nations (UN). So, what
we witnessed in Kosovo was an extraordinary war, a war waged solely
with bombs from the air. What happened in Kosovo was the exact
reversal of what happened in 'Fortress Europe' in 1943-45. Let me
explain. Air Marshall 'Bomber' Harris used to say that 'Fortress
Europe' was a fortress without a roof, since the Allies had air
supremacy. Now, if we look at the Kosovo War, what do we see? We see
a fortress without walls - but with a roof! Isn't that disappearance
extraordinary?!
*John Armitage*: Let's talk about your theoretical efforts to
understand and interpret the Kosovo war in _Strategie de la
deception_. Is the campaign in the air the only important element
that other theorists should pay attention to?
*Paul Virilio*: Let me emphasise the following points about the
Kosovo War. First, while the United States (US) can view the war as a
success, Europe must see it as a failure for it and, in particular,
for the institutions of the European Union (EU). For the US, the
Kosovo War was a success because it encouraged the development of the
Pentagon's 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA). The war provided a
test site for experimentation, and paved the way for emergence of
what I call in _Strategie de la deception_ 'the second deterrence'.
It is, therefore, my firm belief that the US is currently seeking to
revert to the position it held after the triggering of atomic bombs
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the 1940s, when the US was the sole
nuclear power. And here I repeat what I suggest in my book. The first
deterrence, nuclear deterrence, is presently being superseded by the
second deterrence: a type of deterrence based on what I call 'the
information bomb' associated with the new weaponry of information and
communications technologies. Thus, in the very near future, and I
stress this important point, ~it will no longer be war that is the
continuation of politics by other means, it will be what I have
dubbed 'the integral accident'~ that is the continuation of politics
by other means. The automation of warfare has, then, come a long way
since the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Needless to say, none of these
developments will help the plight of the refugees in Kosovo or stop
the actions of the militias operating there. However, the automation
of warfare will allow for the continuation not only of war in the air
but also of the further development of the Pentagon's RMA in the form
of 'Global Information Dominance' (GID) and 'Global Air Power' (GAP).
It is for these reasons that, in my new book, I focus for example on
the use of the 'graphite bomb' to shut off the Serbian electricity
supply as well as the cutting off of the service provision to Serbia
of the EuTelSat television satellite by the EU. And, let me remind
you that the latter action was carried out against the explicit
wishes of the UN. To my mind, therefore, the integral accident, the
automation of warfare, and the RMA are all part of the shift towards
the second deterrence and the explosion of the information bomb. For
me, these developments are revolutionary because, today, the age of
the locally situated bomb such as the atomic bomb has passed. The
atomic bomb provoked a ~specific~ accident. But the information bomb
gives rise to the integral and ~globally constituted accident~. The
globally constituted accident can be compared to what people who work
at the stock exchange call 'systemic risk'. And, of course, we have
already seen some instances of systemic risk in recent times in the
Asian financial crisis. But what sparked off the Asian financial
crisis? Automated trading programmes! Here, then, we meet again the
problems I noted in earlier works with regard to interactivity.
Moreover, it is clear that the era of the information bomb, the era
of aerial warfare, the era of the RMA and global surveillance is also
the era of ~the integral accident~. 'Cyberwar' has nothing to do with
the destruction brought about by bombs and grenades and so on. It is
specifically linked to the information systems of life itself. It is
in this sense that, as I have said many times before, interactivity
is the equivalent of radioactivity. For interactivity effects a kind
of disintegration, a kind of ~rupture~. For me, the Asian financial
crisis of 1998 and the war in Kosovo in 1999 are the prelude to the
integral accident.
*John Armitage*: How does your description above of the chief
theoretical aspects of the Kosovo War map on to the important themes
of your previous writings? I would like to start by charting your
theoretical and architectural interest in questions concerning the
two concepts of military space and the organization of territory. For
example, even your earliest research -- into the 'Atlantic Wall' in
the 1950s and 1960s -- was founded on these two concepts. However,
before we discuss _Strategie de la deception_ and the war in Kosovo
in some detail, could you explain first of all what you mean by
military space and the organization of territory and why these
concepts are so important for an understanding of your work?
*Paul Virilio*: These concepts are important quite simply because I
am an urbanist. Thus the whole of my work is focused on geopolitics
and geostrategy. However, a second aspect of my work is movement.
This, of course, I pursue through my research on speed and on my
study of the organisation of the revolution of the means of
transportation. For me, then, territory and movement are linked. For
instance, territory is controlled by the movements of horsemen, of
tanks, of planes, and so on. Thus my research on dromology, on the
logic and impact of speed, necessarily implies the study of the
organisation of territory. Whoever controls the territory possesses
it. Possession of territory is not primarily about laws and
contracts, but first and foremost a matter of movement and
circulation. Hence I am always concerned with ideas of territory and
movement. Indeed, my first book after _Bunker Archeology_ was
entitled _L'insecurite du territoire_ (1976).
*John Armitage*: In _Speed & Politics: An Essay on Dromology_, you
write of the military and political revolution in transportation and
information transmission. Indeed, for you, the speed of the
military-industrial complex is the driving force of cultural and
social development, or, as you put it in the book, 'history
progresses at the speed of its weapons systems'. In what ways do you
think that speed politics played a role in the military and political
conflict in Kosovo? For instance, was the speed of transportation and
information transmission the most important factor in the war? Or,
more generally, for you, is the military-industrial complex still the
motor of history?
*Paul Virilio*: I believe that the military-industrial complex is
more important than ever. This is because the war in Kosovo gave
fresh impetus not to the military-industrial complex but to the
military-~scientific~ complex. You can see this in China. You can
also see it in Russia with its development of stealth planes and
other very sophisticated military machines. I am of course thinking
here about new planes such as the ~Sukhois~. There is very little
discussion about such developments but, for me, I am constantly
astonished by the current developments within the Russian airforce.
And, despite the economic disaster that is Russia, there are still
air shows taking place in the country. For these reasons, then, I
believe that the politics of intervention and the Kosovo war prompted
a fresh resumption of the arms race worldwide. However, this
situation has arisen because the sovereignty of the state is no
longer accepted. This is also why we are witnessing states rushing
forward in order to safeguard themselves against an intervention
similar to the one that took place in Kosovo. This is one of the most
disturbing, if indirect, aspects of the war in Kosovo and one that I
discuss at length in my new book. Of course, one of the most
disturbing features is the fact that while we have had roughly a ten
year pause in the arms race where a lot of good work was done, this
has now come to an end. For what we are seeing at the present time
are new developments in anti-missile weaponry, drones, and so on.
Thus, some of the most dramatic consequences of the Kosovo war are
linked to the resumption of the arms race and the suicidal political
and economic policies of countries like India and Pakistan where tons
of money are currently being spent on atomic weaponry. This is
abhorrent!
*John Armitage*: Before we turn to consider the aesthetic aspects of
the 'disappearance' of military space and the organisation of
territory in Kosovo, I would like to ask why it was that in the late
1970s and early 1980s you first began to consider the technological
aspects of these phenomena? What was it that prompted you to focus on
the technological aspects at that time?
*Paul Virilio*: Because it was from that time onwards that ~real time
superseded real space!~ Today, almost all-current technologies put
the speed of light to work. And, as you know, here we are not only
talking about information at a distance but also operation at a
distance, or, the possibility to act instantaneously, from afar. For
example, the RMA ~begins~ with the application of the speed of light.
This means that history is now rushing headlong into the wall of
time. As I have said many times before, ~the speed of light does not
merely transform the world. It becomes the world. Globalisation is
the speed of light. And it is nothing else!~ Globalisation cannot
take shape without the speed of light. In this way, history now
inscribes itself in real time, in the 'live', in the realm of
interactivity. Consequently, history no longer resides in the
extension of territory. Look at the US, look at Russia. Both of these
countries are immense geographical territories. But, nowadays,
immense territories amount to nothing! Today, everything is about
speed and real time. We are no longer concerned with real space.
Hence not only the crisis of geopolitics and geostrategy but also the
shift towards the emergence and dominance of ~chronostrategy~. As I
have been arguing for a long time now, there is a real need not
simply for a political economy of wealth but also for a political
economy of speed.
*John Armitage*: But what about the cultural dimensions of
chronostrategy? For instance, although modernist artists such as
Marinetti suggested to us that 'war is the highest form of modern
art', Walter Benjamin warned us against the 'aestheticization' of war
in his famous essay in _Illuminations_ (1968) on 'The Work of Art in
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction'. Additionally, in your _The
Aesthetics of Disappearance_ (1991 [1980]), you make several
references to the relationship between war and aesthetics. To what
extent do you think that the Kosovo War can or should be perceived in
cultural or aesthetic terms?
*Paul Virilio*: First of all, if I have spoken of a link between war
and aesthetics, it is because there is something I am very interested
in and that is what Sun Tzu in his ancient Chinese text calls _The
Art of War_. This is because, for me, war consists of the
organisation of ~the field of perception~. But war is also, as the
Japanese call it, 'the art of embellishing death'. And, in this
sense, the relationship between war and aesthetics is a matter of
very serious concern. Conversely, one could say that religion -- in
the broadest sense of the word -- is 'the art of embellishing life'.
Thus, anything that strives to aestheticise death is profoundly
tragic. But, nowadays, ~the tragedy of war is mediated through
technology~. It is no longer mediated through a human being with
moral responsibilities. It is mediated through the destructive power
of the atomic bomb, as in Stanley Kubrick's film, ~Dr Strangelove~.
Now, if we turn to the war in Kosovo, what do we find? We find the
manipulation of the audience's emotions by the mass media. Today, the
media handle information as if it was a religious artefact. In this
way, the media is more concerned with what we feel about the refugees
and so on rather than what we think about them. Indeed, the truth,
the reality of the Kosovo War, was actually hidden behind all the
'humanitarian' faces. This is a very different situation from the
one faced by General Patton and the American army when they first
encountered the concentration camps at the end of the Second World
War. Then, it was a total and absolute surprise to find out that what
was inside the concentration camps was a sea of skeletons. What is
clear to me, therefore, is that while the tragedy of war grinds on,
the contemporary aesthetics of the tragedy seem not only confused
but, in some way, suspicious.
*John Armitage*: Almost inevitably, reviewers will compare _Strategie
de la deception_ with your earlier works and, in particular, _War and
Cinema: The Logistics of Perception_ (1989 [1984]). Indeed, the very
first chapter of the latter book is called 'Military Force is based
upon Deception'. Could you summarise the most important developments
that, for you, have taken place in the relationship between war,
cinema, and deception since you wrote _War and Cinema_?
*Paul Virilio*: For me, Sun Tzu's statement that military force is
based upon deception is an extraordinary statement. But let us start
with the title of _War and Cinema_. The important part of the title
is not _War and Cinema_. It is the subtitle, _The Logistics of
Perception_. As I said back in 1984, the idea of logistics is not
only about oil, about ammunitions and supplies but also about images.
Troops must be fed with ammunition and so on but also with
information, with images, with visual intelligence. Without these
elements troops cannot perform their duties properly. This is what is
meant by the logistics of perception.
Now, if we consider my latest book, _Strategie de la deception_, what
we need to focus on are the other aspects of the same phenomenon. For
the strategies of deception are concerned with deceiving an opponent
through the logistics of perception. But these strategies are not
merely aimed at the Serbs or the Iraqis but also at all those who
might support Milosevic or Saddam Hussein. Moreover, such strategies
are also aimed at deceiving the general public through radio,
television and so on.
In this way, it seems to me that, since 1984, my book on the
logistics of perception has been proved totally correct. For
instance, almost every conflict since then has involved the logistics
of perception, including the war in Lebanon, where Israel made use of
cheap drones in order to track Yasser Arafat with the aim of killing
him. If we look at the Gulf War, the same is also true. Indeed, my
work on the logistics of perception and the Gulf War was so accurate
that I was even asked to discuss it with high-ranking French military
officers. They asked me: 'how is it that you wrote that book in 1984
and now it's happening for real?' My answer was: 'the problem is not
mine but yours: you have not been doing your job properly!'
But let us link all this to something that is not discussed very
often. I am referring here to the impact of the launch of the
television news service CNN in 1984 or thereabouts. However, what I
want to draw your attention to is CNN's so-called 'Newshounds'.
Newshounds are people with mini-video cameras, people who are
continually taking pictures in the street and sending the tapes in to
CNN. These Newshounds are a sort of pack of wolves, continually
looking for quarry, but quarry in the form of images. For example, it
was this pack of wolves that sparked off the Rodney King affair a few
years ago in Los Angeles. Let us consider the situation: a person
videos Rodney King being beaten up by the cops. That person then
sends in the footage to the TV station. Within hours riots flare up
in the city! There is, then, a link between the logistics of
perception, the wars in Lebanon and the Gulf as well as with CNN and
the Pentagon. But what interests me here is that what starts out as a
story of a black man being beaten up in the street, a story that,
unfortunately, happens all the time, everywhere, escalates into
something that is little short of a war in Los Angeles!
*John Armitage*: In _The Vision Machine_ (1994 [1988]) you were
concerned with highlighting the role of the military in the
'contemporary crisis in perceptive faith' and the 'automation of
perception' more broadly. Has the Kosovo War led you to modify your
claims about the role of the military in the contemporary production
and destruction of automated perception via Cruise missiles,
so-called 'smart bombs' and so on?
*Paul Virilio*: On the contrary. The development and deployment of
drones and Cruise missiles involves the continuing development of the
vision machine. Research on Cruise missiles is intrinsically linked
to the development of vision machines. The aim, of course, is not
only to give vision to a machine but, as in the case of the Cruise
missiles that were aimed at Leningrad and Moscow, also to enable a
machine to deploy radar readings and pre-programmed maps as it
follows its course towards its target. Cruise missiles necessarily
fly low, in order to check on the details of the terrain they are
flying over. They are equipped with a memory that gives them bearings
on the terrain. However, when the missiles arrive at their
destination, they need more subtle vision, in order to choose right
or left. This, then, is the reason why vision was given to Cruise
missiles. But in one sense, such missiles are really only flying
cameras, whose results are interpreted by a computer. This,
therefore, is what I call 'sightless vision', vision without looking.
The research on vision machines was mainly conducted at the Stanford
Research Institute in the US. So, we can say that the events that
took place in the Kosovo War were a total confirmation of the thesis
of _The Vision Machine_.
*John Armitage*: Let us turn to vision machines of a different
variety. To what extent do you think that watching the Kosovo War on
TV reduced us all to a state of _Polar Inertia_ (1999 [1990]), to the
status of Howard Hughes, the imprisoned and impotent state of what
you call 'technological monks'?
*Paul Virilio*: There can be no doubt about this. It even held true
for the soldiers involved in the Kosovo War. For the soldiers stayed
mostly in their barracks! In this way, polar inertia has truly become
a ~mass phenomenon~. And not only for the TV audiences watching the
war at home but also for the army that watches the battle from the
barracks. Today, ~the army only occupies the territory once the war
is over~. Clearly, there is a kind of inertia here. Moreover, I would
like to say that the sort of polar inertia we witnessed in the Kosovo
War, the polar inertia involving 'automated war' and
'war-at-a-distance' is also terribly weak in the face of terrorism.
For instance, in such situations, any individual who decides to place
or throw a bomb can simply walk away. He or she ~has the freedom to
move~. This also applies to militant political groups and their
actions. Look at the ~Intifadah~ in Jerusalem. One cannot understand
that phenomenon, a phenomenon where people, often very young boys,
are successfully harassing one of the best armies in the world,
without appreciating their freedom to move!
*John Armitage*: Jean Baudrillard infamously argued that _The Gulf
War Did Not Take Place_ (1995 [1991]). Could it be argued that the
Kosovo War did not take place?
*Paul Virilio*: Although Jean Baudrillard is a friend of mine, I do
not agree with him on that one! For me, the significance of the war
in Kosovo was that it was a war that moved into space. For instance,
the Persian Gulf War was a miniature world war. It took place in a
small geographical area. In this sense it was a local war. But it was
one that made use of all the power normally reserved for global war.
However, the Kosovo War took place in orbital space. In other words,
war now takes place in 'aero-electro-magnetic space'. It is
equivalent to the birth of a new type of flotilla, a home fleet, of a
new type of naval power, but in orbital space!
*John Armitage*: How do these developments relate to Global
Positioning Systems (GPS)? For example, in _The Art of the Motor_
(1995 [1993]), you were very interested in the relationship between
globalisation, physical space, and the phenomenon of virtual spaces,
positioning, or, 'delocalization'. In what ways, if any, do you think
that militarized GPS played a 'delocalizing' role in the war in
Kosovo?
*Paul Virilio*: GPS not only played a large and delocalizing role in
the war in Kosovo but is increasingly playing a role in social life.
For instance, it was the GPS that directed the planes, the missiles
and the bombs to localised targets in Kosovo. But may I remind you
that the bombs that were dropped by the B-2 plane on the Chinese
embassy -- or at least that is what we were told -- were GPS bombs.
And the B-2 flew in from the US. However, GPS are everywhere. They
are in cars. They were even in the half-tracks that, initially at
least, were going to make the ground invasion in Kosovo possible.
Yet, for all the sophistication of GPS, there still remain numerous
problems with their use. The most obvious problem in this context is
the problem of landmines. For example, when the French troops went
into Kosovo they were told that they were going to enter in
half-tracks, over the open fields. But their leaders had forgotten
about the landmines. And this was a major problem because, these
days, landmines are no longer localised. They are launched via tubes
and distributed haphazardly over the territory. As a result, one
cannot remove them after the war because one cannot find them! And
yet the ability to detect such landmines, especially in a global war
of movement, is absolutely crucial. Thus, for the US, GPS are a form
of sovereignty! It is hardly surprising, then, that the EU has
proposed its own GPS in order to be able to localise and to compete
with the American GPS. As I have said before, sovereignty no longer
resides in the territory itself, but in the control of the territory.
And localisation is an inherent part of that territorial control. As
I pointed out in _The Art of the Motor_ and elsewhere, from now on we
need two watches: a wristwatch to tell us what time it is and a GPS
watch to tell us what space it is!
*John Armitage*: Lastly, given your analyses of technology and the
general accident in recent works such as _Open Sky_ (1997 [1995]),
_Politics of the Very Worst_ (1999 [1996]) and _The Information Bomb_
(2000 [1998]), what, for you, is the likely prospective critical
impact of counter measures to such developments? Are there any
obvious strategies of resistance that can be deployed against the
relentless advance of the technological strategies of deception?
*Paul Virilio*: Resistance is ~always~ possible! But we must engage
in resistance first of all by developing the idea of a ~technological
culture~. However, at the present time, this idea is grossly
underdeveloped. For example, we have developed an artistic and a
literary culture. Nevertheless, the ideals of technological culture
remain underdeveloped and therefore outside of popular culture and
the practical ideals of democracy. This is also why society as a
whole has no control over technological developments. And this is one
of the gravest threats to democracy in the near future. It is, then,
imperative to develop a democratic technological culture. Even among
the elite, in government circles, technological culture is somewhat
deficient. I could give examples of cabinet ministers, including
defence ministers, who have no technological culture at all. In other
words, what I am suggesting is that the hype generated by the
publicity around the Internet and so on is not counter balanced by a
political intelligence that is based on a technological culture. For
instance, in 1999, Bill Gates not only published a new book on work
at the speed of thought but also detailed how Microsoft's
'Falconview' software would enable the destruction of bridges in
Kosovo. Thus it is no longer a Caesar or a Napoleon who decides on
the fate of any particular war but a piece of software! In short, the
political intelligence of war and the political intelligence of
society no longer penetrate the technoscientific world. Or, let us
put it this way, technoscientific intelligence is presently
insufficiently spread among society at large to enable us to
~interpret~ the sorts of technoscientific advances that are taking
shape today.
Ecole Speciale d'Architecture, Paris.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
CTHEORY editors would like to thank Paul Virilio for participating in
this CTHEORY interview, John Armitage for conducting and editing the
conversation, and Patrice Riemens for translating the interview.
_______
John Armitage is Principal Lecturer in Politics and Media Studies at
the University of Northumbria, UK. The editor of Paul Virilio: From
Modernism to Hypermodernism and Beyond (2000), he is currently
editing Virilio Live: Selected Interviews for publication in 2001 and
Economies of Excess, a forthcoming issue of parallax, a journal of
metadiscursive theory and cultural practices.
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# collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets
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