Re: <nettime> Re: Zagreb interview with Michael Hardt

[Soenke Zehle <soenke.zehle@web.de>]

> this totalitarian potential of Empire that Zizek warns about stems not
> only from its appeal for global citizenship. this loosely bounded
> solidarity, a movements' ability to "recognize their common project" is
> exactly the strategy of totalitarian movements.

I don't know if you had seen this discussion in the London Review of Books,
you'll find similar concern about the ambivalence at the heart of the
concept of the multitude in Hardt/Negri's work. Also see the reply to Bull
that appeared on an _Empire_  discussion list (below).

Soenke


by Malcolm Bull, published in The London Review of Books

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n19/bull2319.htm

[...] Since the end
of the Cold War, Neoliberalism has become so ideologically dominant that it
is no longer clear whether the real Neoliberals are the leaders of the G8 or
the people outside in the balaclavas and the overalls. Take Ya Basta!, the
Italian group formed in 1996 in support of the Chiapas uprising, and a
driving force behind the Tute Bianche. They are fighting under the slogan
'per la dignità dei popoli contro il neoliberismo', but their two key
political demands, free migration and the right to a guaranteed basic
income, are policies that were once largely the preserve of Neoliberal
think-tanks in the United States. The idea that everyone should be paid a
basic income, irrespective of any other income they have coming in, or of
their willingness to work, has a long history on the Right. In the early
1960s, Milton Friedman came out in favour of one form of the idea, and in
Britain it has circulated at the margins of Conservative politics for half a
century, being espoused most recently by William Hague's friend Alan Duncan.
Support for free migration has also come mostly from right-wing
libertarians, and in the early 1980s was the sort of topic that found an
airing at Liberty Fund seminars. For Neoliberals one of the attractions of
these policies was their incompatibility with the welfare state. Basic
income was the cheap alternative to welfare, a direct repudiation of 'to
each according to his needs' (it allows for the total removal of social
security infrastructure); free migration, which would make a nation's
welfare benefits accessible to everyone in the world, would quickly make the
hard-won achievements of the welfare system unsustainable.

Just because the 'anarchists' espouse bits of the Neoliberal agenda that
even George W. Bush has not yet got to does not mean they are pursuing
Neoliberal ends. In Italian autonomist politics, the idea of a guaranteed
income developed in the early 1970s not as a means of cutting the welfare
bill, but as part of the effort to uncouple productive labour from the
capitalist economy. As for free migration, it is as natural an outgrowth of
left-wing internationalism as it is of right-wing libertarianism. Still, we
should be wary of interpreting the violent confrontation at Genoa as the
clash of incompatible ideologies. Although it originated from a Marxist
analysis of the class struggle, the conception of autonomy which inspired
the Autonomia movement in Italy and the Autonomen of Germany and Northern
Europe has come substantially to overlap with the Neoliberal ideal of
negative liberty. The initial move looked revolutionary: since Marx had
shown that social relations were not, in fact, the seamless web of bourgeois
mythology, but rather the battlefield of economic conflict, the class
struggle could be waged more effectively if the working class disengaged
from waged labour and sought autonomy for itself. In the Italian context,
the ideal of autonomy also represented the reverse of the PCI's historic
attempt to achieve hegemony through the domination of civil society. By
seeking the leadership of the capitalist state, the PCI was merely helping
to support it: autonomous action, independent of unions and party, would
sever the working class from capitalism, and without labour to sustain it
capitalism would collapse.

In practice, autonomy meant that action once considered relatively marginal
to the class struggle, like squatting or the 'refusal of work' - wildcat
strikes, calling in sick, knocking off early, acts of petty theft and
sabotage - became paradigmatic examples of the 'self-valorisation' of the
working class. At first, these actions were part of a strategy for effecting
revolutionary change, not (as in anarchism) an attempt to realise a new
social ideal. But they soon became ends in themselves, and throughout the
1980s autonomism survived chiefly in neo-tribal squatters' colonies like
Kreuzberg in Berlin and Christiania in Copenhagen. The repoliticisation of
the movement was partly due to the success of the Zapatistas. Their
'autonomous municipalities' and their struggle to affirm an alternative
politics independent of the state provided a new model for all who wanted to
live outside the capitalist system. At the same time, the very fact that
people in remote parts of the world had to fight to establish that autonomy
served to illustrate capitalism's new global reach. However, a shift had
taken place: autonomy had been intended to replace capitalism with
Communism; but as the antithesis of globalisation it functions very
differently: autonomous areas or spheres of activity may constitute local
alternatives to capitalism and so limit its extent, but they are not
incompatible with its continuation. In terms of political theory this is
significant: 'immunity from the service of capital' (as Hobbes might have
put it) is one, today perhaps the most important form of negative liberty,
and autonomous regions and basic incomes are both ways of making it
possible, whereas neither autonomous zones nor basic incomes have any place
in Communism, for both are ways of limiting the demands that people can make
on each other.

It is this intellectual and political context that makes the appearance of
Empire so intriguing. Recently released on parole from Rebibbia prison in
Rome, and an acknowledged influence on Ya Basta!, Antonio Negri has
unimpeachable revolutionary credentials. In the 1970s, he was the leading
theorist of Potere Operaio and later of the Autonomia movement. But in 1979,
the kidnapping and execution of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades gave the
Italian authorities the pretext for the indiscriminate repression of the
extra-Parliamentary Left. Thousands of activists were arrested on political
charges; Negri himself was accused of masterminding acts of terrorism, and
of being the unidentified voice on the line in a phone call to Moro's wife.
There was no hard evidence to substantiate any of these accusations. The
pentiti accused Negri of complicity only in one action and that was more a
hideously bungled prank than an act of terrorism: in the 'kidnapping' of a
Potere Operaio supporter by his friends to extract money from his wealthy
parents, a chloroformed handkerchief was held for too long over the young
man's face. Nevertheless, Negri was sentenced to prison, only to be released
under Parliamentary immunity when elected as a Radical MP. Escaping to
France, where he had the support of Deleuze and Guattari, he continued his
academic career in Paris (Michael Hardt was a student) until 1997, when he
voluntarily returned to Italy to serve out the remainder of his sentence.

Negri's attempt to retheorise the autonomist strategy began during his first
spell in prison, with a study of Spinoza. He found in Spinoza a distinction
(lost in English translations)between potentia ('strength', 'force',
'creative activity') and potestas ('authority', 'command', 'sovereignty').
According to Spinoza, God's power (potentia) is his essence, and what we
conceive to be in his power (potestas) necessarily exists. For Negri this
does not just mean that since God is necessarily creative his creation, too,
is necessary; it subordinates potestas to the continuing actualisation of
potentia: God's sovereignty over the world is, in reality, nothing other
than his world-making. The political import of this distinction emerges in
Spinoza's unfinished Political Treatise, where, Negri claims, the multitude
becomes 'a productive essence' and the potestas of the sovereign is the
potentia of the people.

Here, the old autonomist strategy of disengagement from existing structures
of authority found a new justification. The proletariat may have given way
to Spinoza's multitude, and the language of economics to that of
jurisprudence, but the basic point was unchanged: taking power and making
power are the same thing. The revolutionary potential of this idea was
affirmed in Insurgencies (1999), where Negri pointed out that the English
and American Revolutions had been inspired by just such a doctrine: the
republican theory of liberty, with its emphasis on the constituent power of
the citizenry. In the brief passage 'from resistance to revolution, from
associationism to the constitution of political bodies . . . from militiae
to the armies' was the proof that potentia could become potestas overnight.
All that Marx had needed to add to what J.G.A. Pocock called the 'Atlantic
republican tradition' was the idea that the political always includes the
social. Now, 'political space becomes social space,' and with creative free
labour as its subject, constituent power is 'the revolution itself'.

In Empire, this argument is applied to globalisation. The new world order
represents a new form of imperial sovereignty 'composed of a series of
national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule'.
The account of the way these organisms - the United States, the G8, the UN,
the NGOs, the multinationals and the media conglomerates - exercise their
authority is left rather vague, but in a sense it doesn't matter. Empire,
like other forms of sovereignty (imperium in Spinoza), is only the power of
the people writ large. In globalisation, alternatives to capitalism are not
defeated so much as given new opportunity to work on a global scale: 'The
creative forces of the multitude that sustain Empire are also capable of
autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative political
organisation of global flows and exchange.'

It's easy to see why Empire has proved the most successful work of political
theory to come from the Left for a generation. Not only is it written with
unusual energy, clarity and wit, but it addresses directly the central
political issue of the moment: the perceived distance between ordinary
people trying to live in the way they want and the systems of power that
defeat them. By simultaneously redefining globalisation as a form of
sovereignty and recasting the autonomist project in the republican
tradition, Hardt and Negri offer an exceptionally optimistic analysis of the
problem: remote as it may seem, sovereignty is nothing that a few
like-minded peoplecannot create for themselves. Today's anti-capitalist
protests may look like mob violence, but that is half the point: the street
mobs made America, too; this is counter-Empire in the making.

Nevertheless, the structure of counter-Empire remains obscure. Hardt and
Negri distance themselves from those who merely want to 'defend the local
and construct barriers to capital'. But although their reinterpretation of
autonomy involves more than freedom from the constraints of the market, it
is still recognisably part of the late 20th-century reworking of liberalism.
Negri's rediscovery of republican thought in the early 1980s paralleled that
of Quentin Skinner in Britain, and the retrieval of Anti-Federalism by
libertarians in the United States. In no case did this involve repudiation
of the idea of negative liberty, just a renewed emphasis on the point that
people can be free only if they also have an ongoing capacity for
self-government. For Skinner this meant a call to active citizenship, while
for Negri it involved a reaffirmation of the Anti-Federalist view that the
constituent power of the citizen is not irretrievably transferred to the
sovereign through some contract or constitution. The constituent power of
the multitude is inalienable; it remains, as Negri writes in Insurgencies,
'an irresistible provocation to imbalance, restlessness and historical
ruptures'. Counter-empire is permanent revolution.

This is not the Marxist revolution to which Negri was once committed.
Although hailed by Slavoj Zizek as 'The Communist Manifesto for our time',
Empire is more Jeffersonian than Marxist. Like those who invoke The
Declaration of Independence against the Federal Government, Hardt and Negri
focus on the contradictions generated by liberalism's global sovereignty:
the nuclear bomb (a standing affront to militias as well as to pacifists),
the continuing existence of immigration controls, the reliance of global
business and media interests on government support and regulation.
Cheerfully appropriating the slogans of national Neoliberalism for use
against global Neoliberalism, Hardt and Negri proclaim: 'Now that the most
radical conservative opponents of big government have collapsed under the
weight of the paradox of their position, we want to pick up their banners .
. . It is our turn now to cry: "Big government is over!"'

With its repeated affirmation that we don't have to accept the world as we
find it, and that we can remake it to suit ourselves, Empire is certainly
inspirational reading. But what, if anything, it might inspire someone to do
is hard to say. Because Hardt and Negri's version of republican liberty is a
theory of power rather than of rights it doesn't easily translate into talk
of duties. (Unlike Skinner, they can't call for laws forcing us to exercise
our rights.) Furthermore, their analysis of power is not one that lends
itself to judgments about the way it should be exercised. Both these
difficulties are inherited from Spinoza, whose theological metaphysics
dictated that, since all power is God's power, power must be co-extensive
with natural right. In a state of nature everyone has as much right as they
have the power to exercise, limited only by the antagonistic power of
others. The formation of the commonwealth involves no transfer of natural
right to the sovereign (as in social contract theory), merely an aggregation
of power, and thus of right, that increases the power of the commonwealth
over nature and over the individuals within it. Civil right is natural right
and natural right is power. As Negri puts it in Insurgencies, 'the law
precedes the constitution, the people's autonomy lives before its
formalisation. It is the Tartar who founds freedom, in the experience of his
own right.' 

The belief that civil right is unalienated power is fundamental to Negri's
rethinking of the autonomist programme. But as many commentators have
pointed out, Spinoza's theory licenses tyranny as much as democracy,
counter-revolution as well as revolution. Whoever exercises sovereignty has
the right to do so for as long as they have the power to maintain it. By
replacing Marx with Spinoza, Negri preserves the revolutionary creed at the
expense of its justification. For Spinoza, there is no point at which either
the individual or the multitude is alienated from something that is
naturally or rightfully theirs, so no one has any claim to power that they
do not happen to possess. If someone develops larger muscles, buys a bigger
gun, or stages a successful revolution, power and right are redistributed
accordingly. That is all there is to it.

Spinoza, it's no surprise to discover, is Henry Kissinger's preferred
political philosopher. Whether he is Mrs Thatcher's favourite as well, I
don't know, but on Negri's reading he ought to be. For Spinoza, too, 'the
bourgeois ideology of civil society is only an illusion' and there is no
such thing as 'an intermediate moment in the process that leads from the
state of nature to the political state'. The concept of 'multitude' that
Negri derives from Spinoza is therefore as much a repudiation of civil
society as it is a substitute for the old idea of the 'masses'. According to
Negri, nature constructs individuals,and then, through co-operation, 'an
infinite number of singularities are composed as productive essence.' The
political is 'a multitude of co-operating singularities' coextensive with
the social but not mediated through it. If civil society withers away, so
much the better; the true structure of sovereignty is then laid bare.

Whether Hardt and Negri can actually manage without a more nuanced and
autonomous conception of the social is another question. They object to
social contract theorists who pretend 'that the subject can be understood
presocially and outside the community and then impose a kind of
transcendental socialisation on it'. The dialectic between the civil order
and the natural order is now at an end, they argue,'all phenomena and forces
are artificial' and so 'no subjectivity is outside.' But if there is 'no
more outside', how does that leave the claim that civil right is the
aggregated power which individuals enjoy in the state of nature? Where there
is no difference between the natural and the social, the distinction between
the social and the political becomes all the more important. For what is the
role of constituent power if sovereignty is always already constituted?
Where now 'theTartar who founds freedom in the experience of his own right'?

Ironically, one response to these questions may be found in Spinoza himself.
It is not at all obvious that Negri's interpretation of Spinoza is correct.
In the Theologico-Political Treatise Spinoza had maintained that some sort
of social contract was necessary and that natural right was transferred. In
the Political Treatise, the contract disappears, but whether its elimination
means the continuation of natural right in the civil state or the elision of
the difference between the civil and the natural is less certain. Spinoza
sometimes says the former, but he also emphasises that in the state of
nature where 'the natural right of man is determined by the power of every
individual, and belongs to everyone . . . it is a nonentity, existing in
opinion rather than fact.' Only on entering the commonwealth does natural
right become more than a fiction: 'men in the state of nature can hardly be
possessed of their own right.' On this interpretation, civil right is the
only form of right there is; in the state of nature there is so much risk
that men are virtually powerless againsteach other; far from taking their
unalienated power into the commonwealth, they experience it there for the
first time. For man, the social animal, if not for God or nature, potestas
creates potentia.

It would, I think, be difficult for Hardt and Negri to turn their argument
around in this way. Although they recognise the function of society in the
production of individual subjectivities they barely acknowledge its role in
the production of power. Using Foucault's model of biopower, they argue that
power constitutes society, not the other way round: 'Power, as it produces,
organises; as it organises, it speaks and expresses itself as authority.' In
reply to Machiavelli's observation that the project of constructing a new
society needs arms and money,they cite Spinoza and ask: 'Don't we already
possess them? Don't the necessary weapons reside precisely within the
creative and prophetic power of the multitude?' No one is powerless; even
the old, the sick and the unemployed are engaged in the 'immaterial labour'
that produces 'total socialcapital'. Sounding a bit like Ali G, they
conclude: 'The poor itself is power. There is World Poverty, but there is
above all World Possibility, and only the poor is capable of this.'

It is difficult to see how this analysis comprehends the reality of
powerlessness. You may be able to threaten the world with a Stanley knife,
but you cannot build a new society with one. Insofar as the problems of the
powerless have been addressed in recent years it is often through a dynamic
thatworks in the opposite direction to the one Hardt and Negri suggest.
Their response to globalisation is to maintain that since we have not
contracted into global society, we still have all the power we need to
change it. The alternative is to argue that a geographically boundless
society must also be a totally inclusive society. The latter is an extension
of what used to be called the politics of recognition. Globalisation may
have replaced multiculturalism as the focus of contemporary political
debate, but there is an underlying continuity: the concern of
anti-globalisation protesters with remote regions of the world, with the
lives of people unlike themselves, and with species of animals and plants
that most have seen only on TV is predicated on an unparalleled imaginative
identification with the Other. This totalisation of the politics of
recognition from the local to the global is what has given momentum to
campaigns such as the one for African Aids victims; here, it is a question
of sympathy rather than sovereignty, of justice rather than power. In many
cases, unless the powerful recognised some kinship with them, the powerless
would just die. Capitalism has no need for the 'immaterial labour' of
millions now living. For powerless human beings, as for other species,
autonomy leads to extinction.

The conflict at the centre of the movement against global capitalism is the
tension between its libertarian stance and the demand for global justice.
Although Hardt and Negri are pro-globalisation and anti-capitalism they
belong firmly in the libertarian camp. The 'postmodern republicanism' they
advocate expresses the 'multitude's desire for liberation' through
'desertion, exodus and nomadism'. And although, in his most recent work,
Kairòs, Alma Venus, Multitudo, Negri has written a series of meditations on
poverty almost Franciscan in tone, the political theory he has developed
over the past twenty years lacks the tools to deal with it. The assertion
that the political is identical with the social cannot disguise the fact
that his is a theory conceived entirely in terms of the former. As Hannah
Arendt once noted approvingly of the American Revolution, this was a fight
'against tyranny and oppression, not against exploitation and poverty'.

For Arendt, it was the other sort of revolution, motivated by compassion
rather than the desire for freedom, that led inexorably to terror and
totalitarianism. She may not have been altogether wrong. All those
do-gooders are more dangerous than they look. Even the much-touted idea of a
tax on currency speculation (designed to reduce market volatility and
provide resources for sustainable development) would require worldwide
ideological consensus for its enactment. Chasing foreign exchange trading
from one tax haven to another, and from currency deals to bonds to
commodities to derivatives needs bigger government than anything that
currently exists. Effective environmental regulation would restrict the
movement, fertility and consumption patterns of individuals all over the
planet. The ideological alternative to Neoliberalism is, as Neoliberals
never tire of saying, some form of totalitarianism.

But that can only be a reason for people to start thinking about what new
forms of totalitarianism might be possible, and, indeed,desirable. In the
United States, the discussion has been kick-started by the recent
hijackings. Globalisation appears to have created a world of unlimited risk,
without a corresponding totalisation of the means of social control. Some
commentators, following Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' model,
argue that global social control is impossible and the only way to contain
risk is to maintain the boundaries between civilisations. For Neoliberals,
however, commitment to globalisation necessitates the search for some form
of global authority - the shifting nexus of institutions and alliances that
Hardt and Negri call Empire. But this is never going to yield the type of
intensive social regulation needed to limit all the risks of a global
society. Unlimited risks need total controls and, as Hardt and Negri point
out, 'totalitarianism consists not simply in totalising the effects of
social life and subordinating them to a global disciplinary norm' but also
in 'the organic foundation and unified source of society and the state'.

Hardt and Negri have no interest in the control of risk - a world of
unlimited risk is a world of unlimited constituent power - and they dismiss
the totalitarian understanding of society as one in which 'community is not
a dynamic collective creation but a primordial founding myth.' But the
debate about social control prompted by the hijackings is one that others on
the Left should hurry to join. The issue here is not American hypocrisy
(Nagasaki, not Pearl Harbor, is the relevant comparison): let the Swiss cast
the first stone - London has statues of war criminals all over the place. It
is rather that, without yet realising it, the world's only superpower wants
to achieve something that presupposes greater economic and social
justice.Current US policy may be unacceptable, but the long-term project
holds an unexpected promise.

If the 'war against terrorism' is going to be less of a fiasco than the 'war
on drugs', it requires global social inclusivity and reciprocity. Total
social control involves a degree of microregulation with which individuals
have to co-operate. One way totalitarian societies have differed from those
that are merely authoritarian is in their provision of work and healthcare.
(If you want to keep track of people you cannot abandon them when they are
unemployed or sick.) The link between welfare and totalitarianism works both
ways: social regulation and inclusion go together. If the US wants to make
the world a safer place, it will eventually have to offer, or force other
governments to provide, the population of the entire world with the means to
participate in global society. This will involve real constraints on the
operation of the market, particularly finance capital. Tuesday, 11 September
2001 may prove to be the date at which Neoliberalism and globalisation
parted company.

'Nous sommes tous Américains,' proclaimed the editorial in Le Monde. And not
just those who were horrified by the hijackings: the attack on New York and
Washington was not an act of war against a foreign enemy (it had no
strategic value) but a protest that implicitly acknowledged the sovereignty
of the United States. 'I am an American Airlines pilot,' boasted one
hijacker, drinking in his local bar. A mixture of black humour and wishful
thinking no doubt, but a clear indication of psychological proximity. If
Americans fail to understand why their country is hated, it is often because
they barely comprehend the extent of its influence. No one travels halfway
round the world to kill themselves amid a people with whom they feel no
connection. Even in the Arabian desert, America is uncomfortably close. For
the US, it may seem like a foreign war, but on the other side it is more
like a civil war, dividing families - the bin Ladens, for instance.

One thing that the hijackings have brought to the surface is the extent to
which 'the primordial founding myth' of a total society is already available
in the history of the United States. At one level, Hardt and Negri recognise
this. Their work is free of the European Left's residual anti-Americanism
and represents a systematic effort to appropriate the American myth for the
global multitude. But theirs is the America of potentia not of potestas.
They miss the point that even if the multitude could create its own
Americas, it would be stronger under the sovereignty of the existing one -
not just materially better off, but better able to bring about its social
and political objectives.

The international Left's few successes of the past fifty years -
decolonisation, anti-racism, the women's movement, cultural
anti-authoritarianism - have all had proper (and often official) backing
from within the United States. The United States is no utopia, but a utopian
politics now has to be routed through it. Anti-globalisation is often an
argument for the globalisation of American norms - why should workers in the
Philippines have fewer rights than their American counterparts? Israel will
join the list of 'rogue states' only when the United States becomes more
representative of the population of the world. The totalitarian regimes of
the 20th century got a bad name less because of their monopolistic control
of everyday life than on account of their stifling insistence on a maxim of
shared values, and their draconian punishments for nonconformity. They were,
in Durkheimian terms, attempts to create total communities rather than total
societies. 

The US offers a model for a different type of totalitarianism. Within a
total society - a world of universal anomie populated by the hybridised
subjects of mutual recognition - monopolistic microregulation need not be
concerned with conformity. Of course, a global United States is not a total
society, but total society is rapidly becoming more imaginable than the
state of nature from which political theorising has traditionally started.
In this situation, we need to start thinking in new ways. Negri's version of
what Althusser called 'totality without closure' is a politics without a
social contract, 'a constituent power without limitations'. But in a total
society, it is not the social that needs a contract but the individual - an
anti-social contract that creates individual spaces in a world totally
regulated by meaningless mutuality.

Matteo's reply on "Generation Online"
http://coyote.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/generation_online

Malcolm Bull's review of Empire follows many other commentators in seeing
Negri & Hardt's project as an essentially liberal one. One must wonder
whether critical thought has been so subsumed by capital that it can only
conceive of the collective through the hypostasis of the individual in the
market or dissolution in a totalitarian state? Certainly Bull doesn't appear
to leave us with many options: the state writ large or... the status quo,
liberalism or totalitarianism. It will become clear, however, that the 'or'
is not a choice between alternatives. Bull must, nevertheless, be given
credit for providing one of the most closely argued and most fair-minded
critiques to date.

He begins by setting Negri and Hardt's position in a context that will mark
his reading right through to his conclusions, in which something like a
liberal utopia emerges. The first sign of this appears when Bull sets Negri
& Hardt neatly alongside the advocates of 'negative liberty' and, therefore,
in opposition to the Marxist demand for 'positive liberty': 'from each
according to his ability to each according to his needs.' But one question
that immediately springs to mind is: is this distinction not so marked by
the question of the variety of forms of government, i.e. minimal state as
opposed to 'big government' in its relation to 'civil society', that it is
entrapped by it? Does the fact the Bull sets this distinction to work from
the beginning mean that his reading of Empire is indelibly marked by it?

Let us begin by turning to the account Bull gives of Negri's reading of
Spinoza. Bull presents Negri's turn to Spinoza as a way of 're-theorising
autonomia's strategy' after the repression that struck at 'il movimento' in
the '70s and '80s. But why Negri should turn to Spinoza is a mystery for
Bull. This political decision is presented outside any determined
conjuncture of economic and political transformations - other than that of
the repression of the extra-Parliamentary left. Negri at this time was also
working on a text called La Costituzione del tempo, in which he argued that
what Marx had spoken of as the 'real subsumption of society by capital' had
been realised. The question became, where is resistance to come from in a
society that has been entirely subsumed by capital, i.e. where there is no
exteriority for resistance to come from? The turn to Spinoza was dictated by
this situation: in Negri's reading Spinoza provides an immanent ontology
with no exteriority, in which practice becomes constitutive of the real (and
in the context that we are concerned with here), of sovereignty itself; and
where the multitude augments its potentia (creative power) in the
commonality of relations: the co-operating multitudes (to adopt Negri &
Hardt's terminology). Bull points out the distinction in Spinoza, missed in
English translations, that renders both potentia and potestas (sovereignty,
authority) as 'power', but his reversal of the ontological primacy of
potentia results - as we shall see - in closing any possible alternative to
either the status quo or 'big(ger) government'. But returning to Negri's
decision. It is real economic, political and social displacements that push
Negri towards an engagement with Spinoza.

As Bull points out, Spinoza argues that there are no rights separate from
power, to be precise, right or potestas is determined by the potentia of the
multitude. The crucial point here is that what we are provided with is a
description of the essential materiality of politics in terms of the
relation of forces, as well as concentration on the creative role played by
the masses in the constitution of sovereignty itself. With the rejection of
rights separate from the power to act we also have the removal of the
individual as a meaningful political agent, and the collective dimension of
power (potentia) comes immediately to the fore. To suggest, as Bull does,
that this is the same as saying 'might is right' is to misrepresent the
problem. For with Spinoza's ontological and political prioritsation of the
multitude, it means that to utter such a statement is either to state a
simple tautology (when might is understood as potentia, the power of the
multitudes, as in Spinoza), or it is simply the hypostasis of sovereignty
(if understood as potestas), as is the case - I would argue - with Bull's
reversal of the ontological order. But as Warren Montag points out, if one
accepts Spinoza's account (adopted by Negri & Hardt), then: "There exists no
system of rule, no matter how apparently absolute, that does not rest on an
equilibrium of forces and the ruler who ignores this fact will not rule very
long." In this way any transcendent justification of sovereignty is removed,
by indicating the potentia of the multitude as the material condition of
right. The reversal removes the constitutive role of the multitude (whether
this be in the form of 'the masses' or of 'the people') and means that
sovereignty is 'always already' instituted.

Bull's reversal of the distinction, making potentia dependant on potestas,
means that it is difficult to see a) how sovereignty would be constituted at
all, and b) how the people would be able to influence sovereignty in any
significant way. One would have to rely merely on the good will of the
sovereign - in whatever form it takes, while having no material influence on
its interventions. Following the time-honoured traditions of liberal
thought, the subject is first isolated from relations with others, and is
then constrained in practice, de facto and de jure, by the dictates of
sovereignty. However, the subject, it is argued, would remain free in
thought and speech. For liberals, it is this latter freedom that needs to be
saved, and is considered - in itself - a sufficient counter-power to
sovereignty. One must ask, however, whether by cutting the subject off so
rigorously from practice, we are not left with merely the illusion of
freedom. What we see here is Bull's liberal presuppositions dictating the
reading. There are a variety of political effects that flow from this. We
should not forget, for example, that it is without question 'on the liberals
watch' that we have observed the progressive separation of the institutions
of sovereignty from the multitude, which will be most dramatically
illustrated by the G8 meeting in the Canadian Rockies, or the WTO meeting in
Dubai. But Bull's acknowledgement in the closing stages of his argument that
the tragic events of September the 11th could indicate a watershed in the
transformation of US foreign policy is surely the recognition of the
precarious balance of forces that have produced so much discontent and
insecurity, and that have been duly registered: note the pressure put on
Ariel Sharon to meet with Yasser Arafat, and the fear of further instability
in numerous surrounding states in the region that has lead to the attempt to
create numerous alliances with numerous regimes in the region, with no doubt
economic and security assurances to enable them to pacify the somewhat less
subservient populations of these states. At least in practice,
neo-liberalism acknowledges the power of the multitude. One is forced to
agree with Spinoza that politicians have been far better at understanding
the political, with its complex balance of forces, than the philosophers.
There is no doubt an optimism of the intellect in Empire. But Bull's
suggestion that this analysis fails to comprehend the 'reality of
powerlessness' is only true to the extent that isolated individuals in
poverty are truly powerless. But this powerlessness is multiplied ten-fold
by the liberal presupposition that divides the multitude, that set out from
the presupposition of the isolated individual as the foundation of civil
society.

Bull's disingenuous claim that Negri's 'rediscovery of republican thought
parallels that of Quentin Skinner in Britain, and the retrieval of
Anti-Federalism by libertarians in the United States', arguing further that
Emprie is somehow more Jeffersonian (!) than Marxist is paradigmatic of the
misreading underway. He even quotes from Negri's Insurgencies to back-up
this claim. The fact that in the latter text these traditions take up only
the first part of the analysis of the concept of constituent power (i.e. the
progressively becoming immanent of the relation between the multitude and
potentia) that develops historically and ontologically, moving then on to a
discussion of Marx and Lenin, as those who - in some sense - provide the
conditions for a fully realised account of the constituent potentia of the
multitude, is passed over in silence. Indeed Negri points out that it was
the shortcomings of the Jeffersonian answer that resulted in the reversal of
the libratory idea of the frontier to be overcome, into a hunger for
appropriation and ultimately into imperialism. Empire is - if anything - the
confirmation of this failure, arguing as it does, that the open frontier
that lies at the heart of the American constitution forms the basis of the
'constitutional' structure of modern Empire - one that is always open to
further spaces of accumulation. Had Bull not skated over in silence the
discussion of Marx and Lenin in Insurgencies, he would have discovered a
further deepening of the analysis of constituent power, beyond the
republican tradition, that finds in living labour (i.e. co-operation) the
increasing becoming immanent of the relation between multitude and potentia.

Bull's suggestion that there is in Negri's account of potentia and potestas
an assertion of the 'state of nature' over and against that of civil
society, or rather that subsumes civil society, serves to radically
misrepresent the situation further. The first thing to point out is that the
'state of nature' debate is a mystification that serves merely to: present
the isolated individual as the precondition for the historical eschatology
that ends in the State; as the condition that allows for the construction of
civil society (which Negri argues for Spinoza meant the market, as he was
writing in the days of the 'embarrassment of riches' that was Dutch
capitalism) to operate as a mediator between the egoistic individualism
exemplified in the state of nature; and finally, that both would come to be
subsumed and regulated by the State. I believe, however, that Negri's
argument goes further. I would argue that there has been a radical
displacement of the terms that subverts each of them in turn. But the
subversion is not merely theoretical, but emerges from the changes undergone
by capitalism in reaction to the struggle of the multitude (potentia).
Indeed, I would argue that Negri has shifted the very terrain on which the
distinction operated, opening new theoretical and practical horizons. In the
case of Empire, this real displacement leaves one with neither a hypostasis
of the state of nature or of civil society. What we are left with rather, is
simply the concrete relations in which an individual always already is, and
the rights and laws created by their potentia.

What, on this account, becomes of politics? And what becomes of the relation
between the multitude and the State once both the state of nature and civil
society are done away with? First of all one should note that, if one
retains the tri-partite formula of liberal teleology, any reading of Empire
will inevitably miss the central point: that is, to think a politics of the
multitude outside the pre-conceived schema of civil society and the State.
What Negri finds in the thinking of potentia is the notion of a constitutive
power that can operate outside any notion of constituted (sovereign) power,
precisely because it is its precondition. Liberal theory itself recognises
this constitutive process, but renders it impotent in the theological schema
of the state of war, state of commerce, and state of right. We may have had
to wait for Hegel for this formula to attain its full theological heights,
but all those elements were in place long before.

Negri argues in the last chapter of Insurgencies, that the point is not that
of making the political 'correspond' to the social, but rather of
'inserting' the production of the political into the creation of the social.
In Empire this account is enriched through the adoption of the Foucaultian
notion of biopower, understood here as collective, co-operative, production
of subjectivity by and through the multitude. No doubt Negri & Hardt's
account of such a politics or practice of the multitude is somewhat sketchy.
So it will not surprise Bull to hear that the second volume of Empire is
rumoured to be on the multitude, although Negri's Kairòs, Alma Venus,
Multitudo can also be considered an intense meditation on these questions.

The question remains, however, of the relation of this constituent power
(i.e. the multitude as potentia) to constituted power (i.e. sovereignty, or
potestas). For if constituent power is constitutive of sovereignty one must
ask how constituted power can suppress, control, that which produces it.
Crucial to this question is that of politics in the relation between
constitutive and constituted power. Negri argues that in modernity the State
always returns to bring the constitutive process to an end. That is, in
modernity, constitutive power becomes a peculiar power that is summoned only
at particular moments in time to legitimise the constituted order in
proscribed ways. Modern parliamentary democracy is a paradigmatic example of
this. Every four or five years 'the people' are called to the polls to
decide on the new government. This is on the hand the recognition of the
power of 'the people' as the ultimate source of power, whilst it is also the
neutralisation of that potentia. Constituted power operates a horizontal
representation of the multitude, and a vertical subsumption. That is,
constituent power is dissolved in representation, and projected in the
'space of politics'. This is, in effect, the becoming autonomous of
politics, or its becoming spectacular. Negri goes on to argue that the
neutralisation of the multitude in the predetermined space of politics
requires the further operations of control of the multitude on what we can
call the plane of the social.

The great precursors here are Marx and Foucault. The notion of a
micro-physics of power, developed by Foucault, sees the diffuse distribution
of a diagram of power, or control, that is deployed by social institutions
throughout society. The paradigm of which is the 19th century panopticon
Here potestas exists in all the interstices of society, and operates just as
much through the production of subjects, as it does by brute repression.
Marx, on the other hand, de-mystifies the apparently smooth operations of
the market that structure the social, while at the same time revealing the
material world of antagonistic forces that compose it, and that do so
increasingly as a collective multitude brought together in productive
co-operation. We are left with two elements in an antagonistic relation, on
the one side capital/sovereignty, that operates a subsumption of the social
sphere by intervening in it directly while emasculating it politically; and
the multitude upon which it depends and which exists in the productive
co-operation of its elements. There is no element that may operate a
dialectical resolution here. Thus antagonism becomes ontologically
fundamental. The conditions for a liberal solution simply no longer exist.

Constituted power operates by operations of command, control, and
subsumption - for potestas now aims to shape the multitude directly. Any
pretence to mediation is lost. Potestas does indeed do its best to create
potentia (I refer you once again to Foucault), but it must do this in the
face of the resistance of the multitude. The fundamental separation of
thought and practice that the state watches over and perpetually reproduces,
creating a transcendent realm of freedom of thought while at the same time a
standardisation and repression of practice, what we might call the truth in
practice of liberalism, this is undercut by the ontology of potentia, in
which freedom is identified with the possibilities of material co-operation
and in the relations of the bodies of the multitude. Following Spinoza,
Negri & Hardt, question whether one can truly speak of freedom when all one
has is freedom of speech and thought, i.e. where the latter are utterly
divorced from the practices of the multitude.

But one question we have not yet considered is that of the social production
of potentia. With Marx's notion of living labour as the expression of
multitude and power we have on the one hand an ontological deepening of the
notion of constitutive power, but we have not yet seen how this constitutive
power can in some sense develop, progress, alter, i.e. how time or history
is introduced into this potentia other than abstractly. Hasn't the
separation between constitutive and constituted power become so radical that
it is either a case of suppression of the one or of the other? That is,
where is the innovation of potentia to come from? Negri argues that rather
than see the State always being brought back in as a block on constitutive
power, as occurs in the history of modernity, constituted power should be
made immanent to constitutive power. That is, constituted power is to be
organised in an open relation between origin and exercise of power. In this
way the multitude always operates within determinate conditions that its
serves to constitute, by which it is in turn shaped, but which it is always
able to re-connect with its own founding constitutive power, articulated by
changing balances of forces.

We see most clearly Malcolm Bull's strategy of reversal of potentia with
potestas when he argues that 'it is a case of sympathy rather than
sovereignty, of justice rather than power'. Negri & Hardt, on the other
hand, refuse to move to such an abstract notion of justice, preferring
rather to see justice only in the form directly expressed in the practices
of the multitude; recognising that either such a notion is produced
materially by the concrete demands of the multitude or it is nothing other
than the expression of the potestas of modern sovereignty: which is all too
often more closely linked to strategic decisions and demands of 'big
government' (WTO, G7, NATO...), along with 'big business', than anything
else. This, for example, is evident when we consider an example that Malcolm
Bull himself cites: that of US support for decolonisation. To suggest that
this was a case of sovereign justice, rather than a) the active resistance
of the peoples of the various colonial territories, along with b) a critical
moment in the creation of US economic and political hegemony, is - I
believe - to too readily buy the story of the US as the disinterested
supporter of freedom. Rather, and this time in agreement with Bull, it is
sympathy or love, which augments the potentia of the multitude, that is the
answer: 'Francis in opposition to nascent capitalism refused any
instrumental discipline, and in opposition to the mortification of the flesh
(in poverty and in the constituted order) he posed a joyous life, including
all being and nature, the animals, sister moon, brother sun, the birds of
the field, the poor and exploited humans, together against the will of power
and corruption.'

Bull argues that answers given to the problems of the powerless, in recent
years, have been addressed 'through a dynamic that works in the opposite
direction to the one Negri and Hardt suggest.' Which he characterises as a
form of opting out, or desertion. Bull's answer appears to be some form of
benign totalitarianism, but I feel that this must surely be merely a
provocation. The claim that one should somehow globalise American norms is
at best comical, when one considers that America has the weakest labour laws
in the western world (apart from perhaps the UK), its wealth is dependent
upon exporting the costs of its debt onto the rest of the world and
sustaining some of the most repressive regimes in the middle-east so as to
maintain cheap oil supplies, its democratic credentials are based on the
choice between two identical 'alternatives' (when not decided by a judge)
that vie with one another for who can pocket more wealth from
multinationals, that feels itself entirely justified in bombing whoever it
feels is a threat to its national security (always very flexibly
interpreted), and that has vetoed more UN resolutions than any other country
since the UN was founded. Global totalitarianism is what we have, and it
isn't pretty.

There are of course problems with Empire, some of which Negri himself has
acknowledged (see the interview with Luis Navarro in Carta), not least of
which is the provision of an adequate account of the politics of the
multitude in very different conditions around the globe. There is also a
question about whether this diversity is itself accounted for in Empire.
Perhaps the question of combined and uneven development across the globe
raises its head again. However, the suggestion that 'big(ger) government'
(WTO, G7, the UN Security Council, multinationals, NATO...) is the solution,
can only be maintained if one fails to see that 'big government' is very
much part of the problem. In the present, to call for some mythical contract
can only be to cynically re-legitimise the status quo, or it is an example
of impotent despair. It reminds me rather of Heidegger's impotent cry of
'only a God can save us'. Liberalism very easily turns into totalitarianism,
for its presuppositions are the same, and I am glad that Malcolm Bull has
made such an important contribution by reminding us of this. Bull is right
on another count as well. The terrorist network that carried out the
horrific attacks on New York is indeed closer to the US (but I would add, to
all of the elites of the global Empire) than we might at first think. But
not for the reason he suggests. Let us not forget, the leading members of
the 'terrorist network' are composed of members of the Arab elites who have
never questioned the neo-liberal agenda, who finance themselves thanks to
the liberalisation of financial markets of the global economy, who operate
by a massive repression of their own populations and - in the case of the
terrorists - were trained by the CIA. '"I am an American Airline pilot,'
boasted one hijacker drinking in the local bar"' - apart from anything else,
is this the behaviour of a Muslim fundamentalist?

It is surely naïve to believe that 'big government' - however big - will
step in and regulate global financial markets. Bull's reversal of the
ontological, the material priority of potentia over potestas, would leave us
impotent - more of the same. Rather, it is another system that is needed.
'Un altro mondo è possibile' (Another world is possible) is the slogan on
the placards at Genoa, and perhaps the strategy of autonomia, the strategy
of exodus is no less realistic than to call for the WTO, IMF and G8 to
regulate the system for the benefit of the poor.
Matteo Mandarini
1 I would like to thank Jon Beasly-Murray for comments to a first draft of
this 'reply'. I hope I have been able to answer some of his questions.

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