Kermit Snelson on Tue, 28 May 2002 11:26:24 +0200 (CEST)


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Re: <nettime> parliament of things


> The question is not whether or not sciences has political
> dimensions -- it clearly has.  Science not only describes
> reality, but that it creates it.

I'm not sure whether I agree even with the first sentence, much less the
second.  It's certainly true that at this particular moment in history,
legal and political systems are coming to terms (or not) with technical and
scientific issues such as cloning, genetic engineering, global warming, etc.
But what does that have to do with the ontological status of scientific
knowledge itself?

Because "buzz" issues like global warming are perhaps "too much with us"
(Wordsworth) to think about clearly, let's discuss a much simpler example:
alluvion.  Alluvion is the ancient (we're talking Sumerian- ancient) body of
law having to do with the fact that rivers or other actions of water can
create land, take it away or change boundaries.  A homely aspect of fluid
dynamics and geology, but an object of science nonetheless.  And this
scientific fact occasionally "has political dimensions" even on the level of
international law -- an unusually vigorous action of the Rio Grande, for
instance, once changed the boundary between the USA and Mexico and resulted
in one of President Kennedy's less-famous visits to Texas.  But does this
really warrant the spectacular conclusion that "science creates reality"?

> There are very few scientific facts that can hold up against
> 100 clever lawyers. Take smoking for example.

This example tells us nothing about scientific facts or the nature of
reality.  It tells us only that some lawyers are very good at their calling
and that some scientists are willing to betray theirs.  Did the Microsoft
antitrust trial cast any doubt on the fact that modular design is desirable
software engineering practice?  No.  It cast doubt only on some computer
science professors who, as prostitutes in the "expert witness" racket, took
money to testify otherwise.  Under oath.  That's not science.  That's
commerce.  If we start to confuse reality with the sophistry of professional
rhetoricians, we start to fall under the spell of the powerful.  And we also
forget all philosophy since Plato, the purpose of whose system was primarily
to point out that there's a big difference between sophistry and reality.

> The question is not whether or not sciences has political
> dimensions -- it clearly has.  Science not only describes
> reality, but that it creates it.  Not arbitrarily, but it
> the same way that architects create buildings, which, even
> though they are designed, still must conform to the basics
> of physics.

No, no, no.  We create scientific theories, not reality.  Scientists and
their theories come and go, just like the World Trade Center and the people
that were caught inside.  Yes, we and our creations are certainly real.  But
they're not reality itself.  Because ultimately, we don't really create a
thing.  We only rearrange what we we've been given.  I'm not personally a
believer, but I think that the Book of Job (together with the scriptures of
all the great religions) argues this point persuasively.  Postmodernists and
scientists, however, are always getting into silly pissing matches (e.g.,
the Sokal affair) because both sides are confused on this point.  Scientists
mistakenly think that the "objectivity" of reality carries over to
scientific theories.  Postmodernists mistakenly think that the
"subjectivity" of scientific theories carries over to reality.

Both kinds of error, however, are equally beneficial to the powerful. [1]
Toni Negri took it upon himself in _Empire_ [p.156] to "correct" the New
Testament by declaring that "truth will not make us free, but taking control
of the production of the truth will."  Again, I'm not personally a believer.
But I think that the New Testament may have something a bit more profound to
say than Toni Negri does on this issue.  Truth, in fact, has always been the
great liberator of humanity.  It's precisely the kind of people who talk
about "taking control of the production of the truth" in the name of
freedom, however, who have brought about history's most Orwellian, fascist
despotisms.

If the New Testament leaves you cold, simply re-read the heartbreaking and
infuriating story from the _New York Times_ that Soenke Zehle recently
posted concerning the failure of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
Progressive scientists, allied with the finest postmodern critical legal
minds, came up with something that transformed concepts of
"socially-constructed reality" into the idea that DNA sequences, our
"creations", should be the subjects of intellectual property and other legal
rights.  The result has been simply another tool used to destroy science and
our planet for the sake of money.  And you can be sure that the powerful who
miseducated these well-meaning people were not themselves so naive as to
realize only nine years after the fact what the outcome would be.

> Extending political voice to natural object does not mean
> that they become suddenly dominated by politics, the same
> way than extending voting rights to women in the early 20th
> century did not mean that they were suddenly brought under
> political control (or that they were free from politics
> before).

I'll pass over for now the question whether it's really a good move to draw
a parallel between the women's suffrage movement and that of demanding legal
rights for "natural objects."

Instead, I'll point out only that the granting of legal personality to
natural objects is an idea of hoariest antiquity, a relic of outlandish
barbarism, predating legal institutions even as horrible as the blood feud
and the trial by ordeal.  For instance, it was once common in legal systems,
then not far removed (if at all) from animism, to assume that inanimate
objects could be guilty of wrongdoing.  If a chariot killed a man, the
chariot was placed on trial.  If someone fell from a tree and died, the tree
was chopped down.  In English law this ancient relic took the form of the
"deodand."  If a poorly-stacked pile of firewood collapsed and killed the
neighbor's son, for example, the negligent party had only to hand over the
offending firewood to the child's father and the debt was considered paid.
This practice survived in England until 1846.

I realize that it may be difficult to understand why this is a fair
criticism of the legal revival of animism that Latour is proposing.  Well,
law has a logic of its own.  If you don't see how granting legal status to
the concept of biodiversity can result in trees being chopped down, just as
surely in the days of deodand, re-read Soenke's post.  At least the ancients
were sophisticated enough as lawgivers to know that if you give things legal
rights, then they must also assume legal obligations.  If an object causes
the death of a human being, for instance, it must stand trial.  Some of
today's legal theorists, however, aren't so sensible.  In fact, Latour
suffers from the most extreme case of today's "rights-speak" I've ever seen.
He actually proposes that we grant legal rights to entities that can't
possibly perform any legal obligations.

What is "rights-speak", and what's wrong with it?  A book published fairly
recently in Australia puts it rather well and deserves to be quoted at
length:

     Proponents of rights-speak from various political perspectives suggest
that rights are the solution to the breakdown of older national political
communities in the global era.  In this view, the proclamation and extension
of individual and group rights can ensure the liberty of all, no matter what
the differences are between peoples.  One particular refinement of this
argument maintains that the demise of the nation-state and national
political cultures is a good thing because it means that individuals and
groups will no longer be subject to some 'imposed' national interest and
political identity.  And, as a result, it has now become possible for all
people to have their _innate_ rights respected and to be able to pursue
their own _real_ interest.

     However, the underlying assumption of this argument is that it is
impossible for individuals and groups to negotiate common social purposes,
institutions and processes which can accommodate conflict and difference.
This assumption illustrates how rights-speak forecloses the issue of social
integration and political community by casting a questionable dichotomy
between individual rights (and interests), and people's active engagement
with their political and social context.  More than this, it generally
prescribes rights as the innate possession of individuals, and thus
collapses the issue of social recognition into a series of individualistic
legal attributes.  In this sense it is our contention that the propagation
of rights-speak is part of the malaise of the contemporary world rather than
offering any happy resolve [...]  In other words, rights-speak does not hold
out the prospect of new forms of social contention and integration, merely
the possibility of legal recourse. [2]

Indeed, could any political idea possibly show more disrespect for the ideas
of communicative action and social engagement than one that would lavish our
sacred, hard-won ideas of legal rights on trees and rocks?  Ah, but Bruno
Latour believes he has ways to make them talk.  How does he expect such a
miracle to occur?  A glance at his web site provides a clue.  His latest
book (March 2002) bears the title "Jubiler ou les tourments de la parole
religieuse" and explores, as he puts it, "a type of enunciation,
recognizable in religious speech-acts, that is characterized by its
unability [sic] to transport information or communication." [3]

O-kay.  And while our worthy shaman Latour explores the realms of the unseen
and communes non-communicatively with the inanimate, what say that those of
us stuck down here on the lower planes get busy trying to stop the thugs who
are, as we speak, taking away our lives and our most basic freedoms?

Kermit Snelson

Notes:
[1] Cf. philosopher of science Sir Karl Popper's role in Thatcherism.
[2] Capling et al., _Australian Politics in the Global Era_, 1998
[3] http://www.ensmp.fr/~latour/

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