<nettime> Australia's Watergate :Cover-up or Stuff-up?

["Ozi Media-Junkie" <ozmediajunkie@hotmail.com>]

Cover-Up or Stuff-Up? 

Margo Kingston's  Webdiary (28 May 2002)

http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/05/28/1022569769437.html

A bloke called Tony Kevin has opened another Pandora's Box at the inquiry
into `a certain maritime incident'. Now we've got two - SIEV4, where no
kids were thrown overboard, and the mystery SIEV-X, where 150 children
drowned. `X' is for `unknown'.

Kevin is one of those pesky, obsessive, inquiring types - a career diplomat
who fell out with his department after a stint as Australia's ambassador to
Cambodia. There's bad blood, you might say. He's retired now, and a
visiting fellow in the research school of Pacific and Asian Studies at the
Australian National University in Canberra. 

Kevin has researched and thought about the circumstances surrounding the
death by drowning of 353 boat people on SIEV-X - including 150 children -
on SIEV-X on October 19 last year. You remember the one - just another
Howard vote winner on the election campaign trail. The one where before we
knew who'd survived and what happened Kim Beazley said it was the fault of
government policy and John Howard acted hurt and upset by the remark for
days afterwards. The one where a mother lost her three young daughters in
the water and her husband, a refugee in Australia, wasn't allowed to leave
the country to comfort her. The one where some passengers were forced
aboard at gunpoint into a leaky, overcrowded boat and not allowed to
disembark. The one where an Indonesian fishing boat picked up 44 survivors
after up to 21 hours in the water. 

At the time, it seemed rather odd that the government knew nothing of
SIEV-X until after the tragedy. After the Tampa saga, the Government
ordered Operation Relex - an all out Defence Force surveillance and
interception campaign of boats departing Indonesia, so you'd think it would
be the first to know. But, as usual, political rhetoric drowned out the
basic factual questions. 

But not for Kevin. He started collating the news reports. He told me he got
interested because "I felt that the drowned people had not been treated
with decency - I felt the Australian government had treated them like
rubbish, reflecting its cruelty and callousness during the election."

Relying only on the public record, Kevin penned a submission to the
children overboard inquiry which asked the unanswered questions. Did we
know that SIEV-X had sailed? If not, why not? If so, what did we do about
it? Could we have saved some of the lives lost? Was a navy vessel near
enough to rescue survivors, and if not, why not? Kevin also suggested some
incendiary theories about what could have happened. 

Kevin's submission received a hostile reception from members of the
inquiry, and his intervention looked dead and buried when Rear Admiral
Geoffrey Smith, Australia's maritime commander and the head of Operation
Relex, gave evidence on April 4 and 5.

The mission of Operation Relex, he said, was "to deter unauthorised boat
arrivals from entering Australian territorial waters." It required "an
enhanced and continuous presence and response capability by the Australian
Defence Force deep offshore to in effect establish a barrier between
Christmas Island and Ashmore Island". 

"Larger and more capable surface combatant vessels were therefore required
in order to effectively intercept, warn and, if necessary, board in an
attempt to turn away the SIEVs to a position just outside the Australian
contiguous zone," he said. Defence force planes constantly flew close to
Indonesia to spot SIEVs departing for Australia. 

Democrats Senator Andrew Bartlett asked Smith whether it was normal
practice - once he knew that a vessel was on its way - "to start moving one
of yours in their direction". Smith replied: 

"Yes, if we had information that a vessel was being prepared, we would
probably have a rough idea of the sorts of numbers that might possibly be
embarked. We never really had a strong idea of when things would sail, but
our operation and the disposition of the forces available to us would take
into account that we might not have any warning at all, and therefore we
would be prepared in any eventuality."

So why was the nearest navy vessel so far away when SIEV-X sank? Did the
planes not spot it? Was there no information of its likely departure? Smith
was unequivocal. "At no time under the auspices of Operation Relex were we
aware of the sailing of that vessel until we were told that it had in fact
foundered.

End of story, you'd think, except to explore the results of internal
investigations into how SIEV-X snuck through the surveillance net and
remained undetected as hundreds drowned and a few clung to life in the
water. 

But Kevin was undeterred. In a supplementary submission on April 11 - also
on the inquiry website - he asked: "If Operation Relex did not know about
the sinking until more than (say) 14 hours after it happened - too late for
any RAN ships to reach the scene to (try) to rescue the survivors - did any
other parts of the Australian system know, and if they did, did they delay
passing on this information to Operation Relex and the RAN? If so, for what
reason?"

Enter the director general of Coastwatch, Rear Admiral Marcus Bonser. In
his view, Smith's evidence was wrong. Dead wrong. On April 16, Bonser rang
Smith's office. Smith was overseas, and his chief of staff took the call.
Bonser said Smith's evidence was inconsistent with information given to
both Coastwatch and Operation Relex, in particular on "the first time that
notification of SIEV-X occurred, which was not consistent with the flow of
information as I knew it."

The response? "My message was acknowledged". Then nothing. 

On April 22, at a face-to-face meeting, Bonser informed Admiral Gates, the
head of the defence force task on people smuggling, of the problem. Gates
said he would speak to Smith. 

Again, Bonser heard nothing. He was due to give evidence on May 22. On May
10, he went to the top. He advised the then chief of the navy, Vice-Admiral
David Shackleton, that "there would be inconsistencies between Admiral
Smith's evidence and mine when I appeared at the Senate committee, and he
should be aware of that".

It was not until Thursday, May 16, less than a week before Bonser was to
give evidence, that Smith made contact, advising Bonser by phone that he
would "clarify" his evidence by letter. Either late that week or early the
next, an officer at Maritime Headquarters asked Coastwatch to provide
copies of its operation summaries - all of which Coastwatch had provided to
Operation Relex at the time. 

Then, the bombshell. By letter dated May 17 and delivered to the inquiry
just before it heard from Bonser, Smith admitted that before the sinking,
Coastwatch had passed on intelligence information on SIEV-X - named in
reports as the "Abu Qussey vessel" in honour of the people smuggler
responsible - and the Coastwatch analysis of the intelligence. In fact,
SIEV-X had been under surveillance for quite some time. The purpose of the
Coastwatch reports: To indicate "a possible SIEV arrival in an area within
a probable time window". 

The information:

* October 14: An intelligence report that SIEV-X's departure had been
delayed. Coastwatch "assessed that the vessel remained a potential
departure from Pelabuhan Ratu ... for Christmas Island from Indonesia".

*. October 18: Intelligence sources reported that the vessel had sailed on
October 17. Coastwatch assessed a possible arrival at Christmas Island on
October 18 or 19.

* October 19: Coastwatch reported that SIEV-X was a "possible" arrival "as
it was reported to have departed".

* October 20: Coastwatch reported that the vessel had allegedly departed
Samur on the west coast of Java early on October 19, an intelligence
sources saying it was allegedly "small and with 400 passengers on board,
with some passengers not embarking because the vessel was overcrowded". 

* October 21: Coastwatch repeated its October 20 advice.

If you think it passing strange that nothing was done to check out these
reports, especially given Smith's evidence to the inquiry, consider the
extraordinary circumstance which followed the delivery of the letter.
Defence asked for it back, saying it contained confidential information!
Fortunately for the public's right to know, the media already had copies.

In his evidence on May 22, Bonser provided more intriguing information.
This is an extract from his opening statement.

Abu Qussey was allegedly in the process of arranging a boat departure of
illegal immigrants, probably to Christmas Island. In the ensuing period,
Coastwatch received information that the vessel was expected to depart, or
had departed, Indonesia on four different dates in August, anywhere within
a seven-day block in September and on five separate dates in October. 

"The normal practice was for this advice to be passed by secure phone call
to the Australian Theatre Joint Intelligence Centre and Headquarters
Northern Command. The information was then normally passed on by them to
the Defence commands involved in Operation Relex. Additionally, Coastwatch
included a precis of the relevant information in its daily operation
summary message. This classified opsum was addressed to the Defence
commands and agencies involved in Operation Relex.

"On 19 October, the vessel codenamed SIEV6 was intercepted by HMAS Arunta
off Christmas Island. At this time, Coastwatch and Defence had advice of
potential arrivals from at least six people smugglers, including the
indications about a possible Abu Qussey departure. The organiser of the
SIEV6 was identified on 20 October. 

"The next indicator about the Abu Qussey vessel was on Saturday 20 October
2001, when Coastwatch received telephone advice from the Australian Federal
Police that a vessel was reported to have departed from the west coast of
Java the previous day. The information included advice that the vessel was
reportedly small and overcrowded. The full detail of the advice is
classified. This information was passed by telephone from Coastwatch to the
Australian Theatre Joint Intelligence Centre and to Headquarters Northern
Command. The Australian Theatre Joint Intelligence Centre and Headquarters
Northern Command included this information in classified intelligence
reports, both of which were issued to Defence operational authorities on 20
October 2001.

"On Monday, 22 October 2001, AFP provided further advice to Coastwatch that
corroborated the previous advice about the departure of the vessel and
that, by now, the vessel should have arrived in Australian waters.
Coastwatch agreed that the vessel was potentially overdue, although it
noted this was not unusual and might be due to a range of factors,
including diversions. In the normal course of operations, Coastwatch
informs AusSAR (Australian Search and Rescue) about any vessels that have
been sighted and may be in difficulty or distress. When Coastwatch has
confirmation of departure dates for a SIEV and when it is known to be
overdue, Coastwatch also provides this advice to AusSAR. SIEV-X met these
criteria, based on the additional information received from the AFP on 22
October and, therefore, Coastwatch contacted AusSAR.

"On Tuesday, 23 October 2001, advice was received from the Australian
Theatre Joint Intelligence Centre that a SIEV had sunk. Later that day, CNN
reported the sinking of a SIEV and the rescue of 45 survivors." 

.............

Bonser was asked whether a plane would be sent to the vicinity of where a
boat was reported leaving, or whether that would be covered by standard
surveillance. "The whole general area is being covered by what is probably
the most comprehensive surveillance that I have seen in some 30 years of
service," he replied. Yet the first Bonser knew of the sinking was when
someone in his office saw a CNN television news report! 

Even more startling, Bonser testified that there had been no inquiries at
all - let alone a formal inquiry - into why Operation Relex had not cited
SIEV-X. Asked where SIEV-X sank, Bonser said: "I do not know. I can only go
off what I have seen in media reports that indicate it was ... 80 miles
south of Java." That area "was under surveillance from defence and not
Coastwatch ...You would have to ask them about that...They had ships with
helicopters and aircraft there." Questions of safety of life at sea were
covered by the fact that "a comprehensive surveillance pattern was in place
doing nothing but looking for these boats".

By the end of Bonser's evidence, the inquiry's chief prosecutor, John
Faulkner, had switched his priorities. His primary focus is now on the
mystery of SIEV-X. The AFP will give evidence next month, and you can bet
Smith and a few other Navy witnesses will get a guernsey too. 

This inquiry is unique. Its utterly focused, forensic approach competes
with a public service and a government determined to volunteer nothing. It
could conceivably take years to get to the bottom of what happened when
John Howard so dramatically swung his boat people policy after the Tampa
and implemented it with utter ferocity throughout the election campaign.
The public service and the defence force, under intense practical and
political pressure, are players in what has become a compelling political
thriller. Many books will be written in years to come about the detail and
the implications of this saga - for government, for our defence force, for
our public service, and for our citizens. 

For readers who are interested in the tone, style and intricacy of inquiry
proceedings, I'll put up the text of Bonser's evidence in a separate entry.

Very few in the media touched the SIEV-X story. Gerard McManus of
Melbourne's Sunday Herald Sun was one, the Canberra Times another. It's not
surprising: The effort is huge, the yarn complicated, the results
uncertain. Last week, the SBS program telecast a timely investigation by
reporter Geoff Parish. Here is the transcript.

--------------------------------------------

Boat People - Cover-up or Stuff-up   

Dateline, SBS (22 May, 2002) 

Few people would remember the name Sundous Ismael, but her face will be
familiar to many. She was the mother who lost three young children when the
refugee boat on which the family was travelling to Australia sank last
October. The disaster took 353 lives. Australia had said it knew nothing
about the vessel until after it foundered. But a former Australian diplomat
claims someone in Canberra must have known and should have acted to save
those who perished. That allegation has been backed up today by some
surprising revelations at the Senate`s children overboard inquiry.
Dateline's Geoff Parish has more.

Parish: This is the sharp end of Australia's tough policy to deter asylum
seekers, known as Operation Relex. A unit from HMAS Arunta has boarded a
boat and is taking it back to Indonesia. The asylum seekers are angry,
confused and desperate. One man throws himself into the water. A child is
held up. Operation Relex was top secret until the Senate began its inquiry
into "A Certain Maritime Incident". Unofficially, it's called "the children
overboard inquiry". Now, Australia's most senior naval commanders and
public servants are being grilled. The committee wants to know how
Operation Relex works, the chain of command and where information flows.
Rear Admiral Geoffrey Smith is Australia's Maritime Commander. 

Senator Bartlett: Just in terms of the range of your commands with
Operation Relex, does that include all of the vessels patrolling the
regions? Does that include the Orion aircraft as well as navy vessels? 

Admiral Smith: Yes, it does, Senator. 

Bartlett: So you would be aware of that their movements are and what they
see. They would be providing reports to you as well? 

Smith: Yes, that is correct. There were RAAF P3s, and there were also
Coastwatch aircraft which were working to us for this operation. 

Parish: Operation Relex has thrown a surveillance and naval interception
net over the north-west approaches to Australia that extends almost to
Indonesia. 

Smith: You must look at this operation in all dimensions. The air
surveillance was being conducted up near the Indonesian archipelago, as
close as 30-odd miles, and south from there. The ships, however, were
positioned where we felt them best positioned to maximise our chances of
interception. 

Parish: Australia also gathers intelligence in Indonesia's ports and along
the coastline. And it's not just a military operation. Above all this sits
the Government's People Smuggling Task Force. It feeds information and
operational advice to the highest levels, including the Prime Minister's
Office. Operation Relex has so far intercepted 12 suspected illegal entry
vessels, known by their acronym as SIEVs. But on May 1, the inquiry dealt
with a vessel known as SIEV-X that sank, killing 353 people. 

Tony Kevin: I greatly admire the professionalism, camaraderie and integrity
of the navy and of the Australian Defence Force as a whole. 

Parish: Tony Kevin, former Australian ambassador to Cambodia, appeared
before the inquiry and made some disturbing assertions. 

Kevin: Something went seriously wrong in the information chain in
Australia's border protection system during October 2001 that had terrible
human life consequences. 

Parish: Kevin reminded the inquiry that SIEV-X had been grossly overloaded
with people forced to board under duress. After sailing for about a day and
a half, it sank on October 19 last year. There were only 44 survivors. One
was Sundous Ismael. She lost her three young children and her sister. Her
picture was flashed around Australia and around the world. Her grief
humanised the plight of the asylum seekers. She'll never forget the moment
the boat went down. 

Sundous Ismael (translation): Then a big wave struck us from the side and
we sank. All of us, children, women and men. The men had been standing on
one side in order to balance the boat. Those men fell straight into the
sea. The children were sliding off into the sea. 

Parish: It was by far the largest loss of life in people smuggling
operations to Australia. Tony Kevin's highly controversial view is that
Australia must have known about the vessel and should have done something. 

Kevin: There were many ways that Australia might have acted to prevent the
loss of 353 lives, if that information had come to Canberra in time and if
it had been properly handled in Canberra at the time it sank. 

Parish: Shocked by the magnitude of the tragedy, Kevin began to investigate
what had happened. After careful calculations, based on media reports and
information given in the Senate inquiry, he concluded the boat went down in
international waters, and not in the vicinity of Indonesia's Sunda Strait
as claimed by the Australian Government. Where the boat sank is crucial.
All vessels must respond to a Safety of Life at Sea Emergency, known as
SOLAS. That includes the powerful navy frigates of Operation Relex, if they
receive information of a SOLAS emergency. 

Kevin: Just showing you - the first map just showing the area of operation
of Operation Relex - you have got Christmas Island over here and Ashmore
Reef over here and you have got the 30-mile off Java up here, running along
there. 

Parish: Kevin has also used information contained in this letter from
Defence Minister Robert Hill to Opposition Leader Simon Crean. It states
the Government view that the vessel was in the vicinity of the Sunda Strait
when it sank on October 19. The letter also says that the frigate HMAS
Arunta was at no time closer than 150 nautical miles from the Sunda Strait,
where it is believed the refugee vessel sank. 

Kevin: They were in the water for 22 hours and dying gradually in the water
as people lost the will to live and dropped off their planks, and Arunta
could have been there in four hours. So even if Australia had, for example,
only became aware of the sinking as the sinking happened, for example
through satellite imagery or through some kind of aerial surveillance,
there would have still been time to do something had there been the will to
do something. 

Parish: Dateline has obtained a set of co-ordinates from the Harbour Master
here at Sunda Kelapa port in north Jakarta. The coordinates are from this
document, detailing the rescue by Indonesian fishing boats and the point
where the survivors were picked up. The position is very similar to Tony
Kevin's calculations of where the boat went down. Expert advice provided to
Dateline say the coordinates are 51.5 nautical miles from the Indonesian
coastline. If the coordinates are correct, then the vessel sank in
international waters well beyond the Sunda Strait and within the
surveillance area of Operation Relex. 

Kevin: If it went down in the Indian Ocean, more than 12 miles from
Indonesia, and particularly if it went down at 30 miles from Indonesia,
which is the outer limit of Australia's air surveillance under Operation
Relex - Australia's regular air surveillance - well, that makes it a SOLAS
completely in international waters requiring an emergency response from the
nearest available country's resources that can do something about it. 

Parish: Presumably HMAS Arunta? 

Kevin: Yes. 

Senator John Faulkner: I think you are saying to us that your thesis is,
given the intensity of this issue in terms of its prominence in terms of
Government policy and the sensitive time and the priority that Operation
Relex has with the resources applied to Relex, it is not likely that any of
these vessels wouldn't have been closely tracked. Is that what you are
saying to us? 

Kevin: Yes. 

Faulkner: Without going into all the detail of it, you are making that
assumption? 

Kevin: It's not really an assumption, Senator. It is based on my careful
reading of evidence in this committee by expert witnesses. 

Parish: So, who knew what about the ill-fated SIEV-X, when did they know
it, and where did that information go? That's precisely what the Senate
inquiry has been trying to find out. Defence Minister Robert Hill's letter
to Simon Crean contains more important information, specifically that
Coastwatch had, in fact, advised Australian authorities that a vessel had
departed the Sunda Strait, on or about 18/19 October 2001, bound for
Christmas Island, and was overdue. But the Australian Maritime Safety
Authority told the Senate inquiry they only received the message on 22
October. 

Clive Davidson, Australian Maritime Authority CEO: AMSA's records show that
it had no prior knowledge about the departure of this vessel. The first
advice on our records was by Coastwatch on October 22 last year. 

Parish: By then, the boat was more than overdue. It had sunk three days
earlier on the 19th. The Maritime Safety Authority even sent a fax to their
Indonesian counterpart, BASARNAS, noting the vessel was late. But had the
ill-fated boat still been afloat, there was no way that BASARNAS could have
responded. They have no record of the fax. 

L Sipahutar, chief of BASARNAS (translation): So, looking at all the data I
have, all my log books and my staff's diaries, it isn't there. And I repeat
- when there is a report from anywhere, as long as it comes to our fax
machine, a record is made of where it is from. Only then is it distributed. 

Parish: AMSA says it was sent, but incredibly weren't concerned enough to
check it had arrived. 

Davidson: We do ring them from time to time and have discussions to ensure
that they are aware of the situation. But in a case like this, I think our
records show there wasn't any phone contact. 

Parish: And what of the high priority Operation Relex, with all its naval
intelligence-gathering capabilities, its aircraft surveillance and navy
frigates? They too apparently knew nothing. 

Admiral Smith: First of all, I must say that I cannot pass up the
opportunity to get this on the record. I took great offence, on behalf of
the navy, at that suggestion that a professional organisation such as our
navy would even allow or ignore a circumstance such as that if we were in a
position to be able to assist. And indeed, the first time that the navy
knew that this vessel had sailed was in fact we were advised through the
search-and-rescue organisation in Canberra, that this vessel may have
foundered in the vicinity of the Sunda Strait. At that time our nearest
ship was about 150 miles away. 

Kevin: It's all back to front. I mean the idea that the navy sits and knows
nothing until Coastwatch or AMSA tell it about an asylum seeker boat that
has gone missing on the way to Australia - when the navy is precisely in
the business of tracking and intercepting asylum seeker boats on the way to
Australia - is incredible. 

Parish: Incredible or not, it is one of a series of unexplained events in
this tragic tale. Why, for example, were 400 people crammed under duress
onto a leaky boat that, even if it were seaworthy, could carry no more than
150 people in safety? Sundous Ismael went into the water at about 3pm on
Friday afternoon on 19 October. But when it grew dark, she thought she'd be
rescued. She and other survivors tell of two large boats that shone bright
lights on them. According to Sundous, the boats stayed for what seemed like
hours. 

Sundous Ismael (translation): People were blowing their whistles, everyone
was blowing their rescue whistle. I don't know if they heard us. We
expected them to hear. They were very close to us. 

Parish: By morning, the mysterious vessels were gone without rescuing a
single asylum seeker. As we've heard, the Australian Navy say they had no
boats in the area. Sundous was rescued by an Indonesian fishing boat around
8:00am the next day. She'd spent about 18 hours in the water. Some
survivors spent even longer. Remember, HMAS Arunta was only about five
hours away. Tony Kevin is now very publicly putting the view that
information about the boat was in the system, but nothing was done about
it. 

Kevin: I read into that the possibility of a decision having been taken in
Canberra - somewhere in Canberra - that this boat was probably not going to
get to Christmas Island anyway, so it wasn't necessary for the navy or
Operation Relex to be told about it, that basically the problem of this
boat would solve itself. 

Parish: Now, that's a very strong statement? 

Kevin: Yes. 

Parish: You see no other interpretation could be drawn from this series of
events, perhaps there may be any other number of possibilities occurred? 

Kevin: There isn't any other number. There's the possibility of a
bureaucratic stuff-up, there's the possibility that somebody lost the
report. I frankly find that hard to countenance. 

Parish: Today, there were dramatic developments in the Senate inquiry
contradicting previous testimony by Maritime Commander Rear Admiral Smith.
The head of Coastwatch testified that it had provided information to
military intelligence about a vessel being prepared by people smuggler Abu
Qassai as early as August last year. It was the ill-fated SIEV-X. 

Rear admiral Marc Bonser, director general, Coastwatch: Coastwatch
originally received information as early as August 2001, that Abu Qassai
was allegedly in the process of arranging a boat departure of illegal
immigrants, probably to Christmas Island. 

Parish: An intelligence report provided the day after the vessel left port
even included this chillingly accurate assessment. 

Bonser: The information included advice that the vessel was reportedly
small and overcrowded. The full detail of the advice is classified. 

Parish: And there were more revelations. A letter from Maritime Commander,
Rear Admiral Smith, was tabled, titled "Clarification of Evidence". It
contradicted his earlier testimony to the Committee given under oath, and
confirmed the Coastwatch evidence, that the navy knew about SIEV-X well
before it sank on October 19. The letter details intelligence received by
the navy in relation to SIEV-X on no less than five occasions including
prior to its departure. But Smith terms much of the intelligence
'inconclusive' and writes that "No specific confirmation of departure was
ever received." Be it confusion, conspiracy or cover-up, it looks
increasingly like Tony Kevin's concerns are well founded. 

353 Dead: This Could Be Our Watergate By Tony Kevin, The AGE (May 10
2002)http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/05/09/1020914030024.html Human
tragedy is the stuff of news. A boat sinking and the death by drowning of
353 men, women and children is a big story in anybody's language. That this
tragedy happened to a leaky, overloaded asylum-seeker boat on its way to
Christmas Island on October 19 last year, at the height of Operation Relex,
a major and forceful Australian military operation to detect and repel
asylum-seeker boats, makes it an Australian story.

So it is particularly important for our self-respect as Australians that we
try to understand how and why this tragedy happened. 

But in fact, after the initial three-day sensational media coverage, the
story quickly died. There was no investigative Australian journalism.
Compare this to the exhaustive and sustained media coverage of, say, the
Thredbo landslide disaster.

But on this story, our media unquestioningly swallowed the Federal
Government's spin: that this was an Indonesian maritime disaster, in
Indonesian territorial waters, and solely the result of a greedy people
smuggler overloading his boat. The media bought the government's convenient
line: that what happened to this boat had no connection at all with
Operation Relex; that this maritime disaster was nothing to do with us.

The desired lesson having been spelt out - that the tragedy starkly
illustrated the dangers of people smuggling - the Howard Government quickly
"moved on". Asylum seekers, who had been very briefly acknowledged as
victims and fellow human beings, went back to being dehumanised as faceless
alien invaders. 

The moral sickness at the heart of our ugly election campaign took hold
again. The human tragedy to our near north - which has left hundreds of
bereaved and grieving families, including many living here in Australia -
was forgotten.

>From the beginning, I had a strange foreboding about this dreadful event.
Somehow it seemed too conveniently timed

In at least three ways, this tragedy strongly benefited the government's
border protection agenda. Overnight, Indonesia abandoned its previous
opposition to hosting a people-smuggling conference, for which Australia
had been pressing.

Indonesia also from now on quietly accepted the forced towback of
asylum-seeker vessels by the Australian navy to the Indonesian territorial
waters boundary - something Indonesia had previously said it would resist.

And finally, the tragedy dealt an enormous setback to the people-smuggling
industry in Indonesia: it sent a powerful signal to asylum seekers that it
was no longer safe for them to try to reach Australia by this means.

If the challenge of people smuggling has now been defeated, I am sure that
this event was the turning point in achieving this outcome.

Since January, I have independently researched the story. So far, I have
uncovered glaring inconsistencies or discrepancies in the official
Australian public record. But the story still has a long way to go. 

I am neither a whistleblower from within the defence system nor a Woodward
and Bernstein-style young investigative journalist. Basically I am a
retired old fart, with some analytical skills from my previous profession -
within the Department of Foreign Affairs - and some ability to smell a rat.

What we do know is that by mid-October, Operation Relex was efficiently
detecting and intercepting suspected illegal entry vessels (SIEVs).

Its success rate was 11 out of 12. It was a three-stage system: timely and
accurate intelligence reporting giving place and time of embarkation,
intended destination, and number of passengers; aerial surveillance up to
as close as 50 kilometres from Indonesia of ''windows" of sea where boats
were expected to appear; naval interception in contiguous zones (40
kilometres north of Christmas Island and Ashmore Island).

For Operation Relex to succeed, information had to flow promptly around the
command and information chain in Canberra. But information about SIEV X
(the boat that sank), which Coastwatch had from intelligence, and which
thus should have also been passed to Operation Relex, was not so passed. As
a result, crucial information that could have saved 353 lives did not reach
the Australian navy.

I am now satisfied that no navy ship was present at the scene of the
sinking, and that the nearest ship, HMAS Arunta, was 150 nautical miles
away. I am also satisfied that neither Arunta, nor the navy as a service,
knew on October 19 about SIEV X's emergency on that day. I am satisfied
that if they had known, they would have tried to rescue survivors.

But other specific questions remain.

Most importantly, we don't know why information that Coastwatch got from
intelligence sources about SIEV X's embarkation on October 18 or 19 was not
passed to Operation Relex and the navy at the same time that Coastwatch
first got it. We don't know yet when Coastwatch got this information. Don't
all these organisations depend on the same central intelligence
coordination headquarters? Did not Operation Relex require timely and
accurate intelligence about SIEV boats coming down from Indonesia? What was
different about this boat - why was it treated so differently from all the
other SIEVs?

There are two issues about which I raise questions: my concerns about what
happened to information on this boat in Canberra, and my concerns that, in
the absence of a detailed account, the sinking itself could be seen to have
possibly been a managed event.

On the second issue, we await further public information from Indonesia,
which I hope will sooner or later emerge.

On the first issue, I hope that the Senate committee into the "children
overboard" affair will try to throw further light on the inconsistencies in
what ministers and officials have said.

Let us suppose that a timely intelligence report had come down from
Indonesia to Canberra on Thursday, October 18, saying that a boat had left
Bandar Lampung early that morning in a grossly overloaded and unseaworthy
condition, and that it was not expected to reach Christmas Island. It is
reasonable to expect any intelligence report on the boat's departure would
have also contained that information.

If such a report had immediately gone to Operation Relex, I expect that one
or more of the following actions would have been decided: informing the
Indonesian search-and-rescue organisation of an expected emergency,
directing air surveillance of international waters where the boat might
first appear, moving HMAS Arunta into a position to be ready to effect a
quick rescue if necessary, once the boat crossed the boundary of
Indonesia's contiguous zone.

If those things had been done, many lives might have been saved when the
boat sank - some 30 hours after its departure.

This is not what the Senate's "children overboard" committee was first set
up to examine, but it might in the end prove to be the committee's most
important task. This could become an Australian Watergate.

Tony Kevin worked for the Department of Foreign Affairs between 1968 and
1998. He was Australian ambassador to Cambodia from 1994 to 1997. This is
an edited extract of his speech in Canberra last night to a refugee action
committee.


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