Brian Holmes on Tue, 29 Jan 2013 10:14:36 +0100 (CET) |
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Re: <nettime> Nobel laureate in economics aged 102 endorses the human economy... |
I quite enjoy this discussion. On 01/28/2013 08:36 AM, Newmedia@aol.com wrote: > What sort of economic growth does "informationalism" (or what many > have long called "The Information Age" and what was originally > called "Post-industrialism") offer for those economies that no > longer have industrialization (i.e. the earlier 4x "surges" > described in her work) to drive living standards -- like North > America, Europe and Japan? Ha ha! Well, in the US from about 1980 onward, the information age offered a very high return on private finance and a steady stream of purchasers for govt bonds. Mr. Reagan pioneered this combination, in concert with Paul Volcker who was then head of the Federal Reserve. By raising the Fed prime rate to almost 20% they provoked an extremely deep recession which produced double-digit inflation and destroyed entire sectors of US business, including much of the former manufacturing base. However they also attracted capital from around the world, first because of the interest rate itself, then because financial returns surged after the "short, sharp shock." On the strength of that "accomplishment" Reagan launched his Star Wars program, which the US paid for by selling a very large amount of bonds: the two Reagan administrations doubled the national debt, pushing it over $1 trillion for the first time. That set the pattern for the entire period that followed, up till now, since the 2008 crisis has not changed anything in this respect. The US can easily run a trade deficit of $785 billion in 2011, and bail out the banks to boot, and pay for a variety of overseas wars as well, all because of this strange "political" capacity to borrow outrageous sums of money, something that no other country in the world can do. (The City of London was, however, also quite good at attracting global investment in the 80s and 90s, even while the UK went down the tubes, public services collapsed, illiteracy rose, etc.) I follow the technology all the time, Mark, but I can't disentangle it from political economy as you seem to want to do (but maybe I am reading you wrong). The internationalization of business since the early 80s, or "globalization," required huge regulatory changes from the participating countries: the abandonment of import tariffs; the abandonment of capital controls and the acceptance of foreign direct investment; the abandonment of welfare programs to cheapen labor costs; the free convertibility of national money; the expansion of currency futures markets to handle the monetary fluctuation; etc. All of this was an international political agenda driven by Reagan and Mme Thatcher, with Hayek and Friedman as the key theorists (Friedman actually launched the currency futures market at the Merc in Chicago in 1972, he was way ahead of the curve). It's called "neoliberal" because it is inspired by important aspects of the British free-trade regime of the 19th century, which itself was called "liberal." The two regimes are finally quite different though, because the British one used gold and the current one uses fiat money that can be produced whenever govts want it, especially the USG which has been printing wildly since 1968. You can't separate the development of technology from political management techniques, both of domestic economies and of international economic relations. So, as far as I can tell, the change of the US economy from 1980 onward was indeed technological in at least two respects. First, the development of the new military technologies that came to be known as the "revolution in military affairs" fortified the US role as global policeman (the US military budget is larger than the rest of the world's military budgets combined) and in that way, "protected" the status of the dollar as international reserve currency, ensuring that the US could go on borrowing from the rest of the world. Second, the surge in information and communications technologies, stimulated by the military budget, ultimately gave rise to the 1990s network technology growth wave, where the US economy grew relatively fast, salaries rose for professionals and the budget was even balanced for a short time. Between the 80s and the 90s two very political things happened: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War (where the revolution in military affairs was put vividly on display). These political events set the stage for a huge round of foreign direct investment and then a massive expansion of the financial economy, which together make up what is called US-led globalization. The cabling of the world and the installation of network technologies in all major urban areas seems to have had a knock-on effect on financial markets: computerized trading, centered in New York, Chicago, London and Tokyo, began to expand from the mid-80s onward and since the mid-90s it has never stopped exploding. A further important change brought by the global installation of networks has been the capacity to coordinate global manufacturing and distribution according to "just-in-time" methods; this, along with foreign direct investment, was essential for the industrial development of China. It ultimately led to the "Walmart effect," ie the almost complete disappearance of basic manufacturing in the US. The result of all that is not sustained growth in the US, but instead, a global economy where capital elites can get very very rich off operations happening anywhere on earth, whether in industry or in finance. Thus the surging fortunes of the 1%. What has happened is that the US capitalist class, with the aid of allies in the UK and around the world, has guided the development of the computer-tech wave for their exclusive interests - somewhat like the British imperial elites managed the railroad boom back in the heyday of liberal free trade. However, what's happening to the US now is also a little comparable to what happened to the Brits in the early 20th century: by putting all your money in a financialized world economy, and then spending the profits on war in order to protect overseas assets, finally you ruin yourself in every sense of the world. The migration of industrial development out of the US and the abandonment of US populations to poverty is now causing the decline of the country. At some point there will be a larger crisis and the ability to borrow will be curtailed. On this we undoubtedly agree. Plus I also agree that robotization of production is very much a part of the current crisis, and Race Against the Machine is an important book (on the same subject there's also The Lights in the Tunnel by Martin Ford, check it out). Now, I further agree with you that the Left has been pretty bad at following all this, although if you hunt around you can find some decent scholarship. In addition to the technological innovation school of Freeman, Louca, Perez, etc I would suggest you look into the "Social Structures of Accumulation" theorists who provide exactly what Perez calls for but does not produce, namely an understanding of the institutional frameworks in which the long waves of technological development unfold. These two schools would appear to be a marriage made in heaven, but they never quote each other, most people have never even heard of them and so we all remain ignorant! In terms of numbers, I have been looking at a bunch of them. Here is an interesting tidbit for you: Europe, or at least Germany, is not doing so bad when it comes to export-led growth. In 2011 Germany exported $1.48 trillion, for a positive trade balance of $220 billion. That compares pretty well with China, a country almost twenty times larger in population, which exported $1.9 trillion in 2011, for a positive balance of $156 billion. Germany seems to have managed its political economy differently than the US! Here's another tidbit for you, taken from the UN's comparative GDP stats that you can find here: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/downloads/Download-GDPcurrent-USD-countries.xlsIn 2011, China's GDP was $7.2 trillion and its gross fixed capital formation totalled $3.3 trillion. The US GDP for that year was $15 trillion - over twice as much - and yet gross fixed capital formation was $2.2 trillion. Who do you think will have better infrastructure coming out of this depression and into the next long wave?
still trying to make sense of it all, Brian # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime@kein.org