<nettime> Possible Outcomes of the Russo-Ukrainian War and China

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Possible Outcomes of the Russo-Ukrainian War and China’s Choice

by US-China Perception Monitor March 12, 2022

Hu Wei is the vice-chairman of the Public Policy Research Center of the 
Counselor’s Office of the State Council, the chairman of Shanghai Public 
Policy Research Association, the chairman of the Academic Committee of 
the Chahar Institute, a professor, and a doctoral supervisor.


Written on March 5, 2022. Translated by Jiaqi Liu on March 12, 2022.

https://uscnpm.org/2022/03/12/hu-wei-russia-ukraine-war-china-choice/

The Russo-Ukrainian War is the most severe geopolitical conflict since 
World War II and will result in far greater global consequences than 
September 11 attacks. At this critical moment, China needs to accurately 
analyze and assess the direction of the war and its potential impact on 
the international landscape. At the same time, in order to strive for a 
relatively favorable external environment, China needs to respond 
flexibly and make strategic choices that conform to its long-term interests.

Russia’s ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine has caused great 
controvsery in China, with its supporters and opponents being divided 
into two implacably opposing sides. This article does not represent any 
party and, for the judgment and reference of the highest decision-making 
level in China, this article conducts an objective analysis on the 
possible war consequences along with their corresponding countermeasure 
options.

I. Predicting the Future of the Russo-Ukrainian War

1.  Vladimir Putin may be unable to achieve his expected goals, which 
puts Russia in a tight spot. The purpose of Putin’s attack was to 
completely solve the Ukrainian problem and divert attention from 
Russia’s domestic crisis by defeating Ukraine with a blitzkrieg, 
replacing its leadership, and cultivating a pro-Russian government. 
However, the blitzkrieg failed, and Russia is unable to support a 
protracted war and its associated high costs. Launching a nuclear war 
would put Russia on the opposite side of the whole world and is 
therefore unwinnable. The situations both at home and abroad are also 
increasingly unfavorable. Even if the Russian army were to occupy 
Ukraine’s capital Kyiv and set up a puppet government at a high cost, 
this would not mean final victory. At this point, Putin’s best option is 
to end the war decently through peace talks, which requires Ukraine to 
make substantial concessions. However, what is not attainable on the 
battlefield is also difficult to obtain at the negotiating table. In any 
case, this military action constitutes an irreversible mistake.

2.  The conflict may escalate further, and the West’s eventual 
involvement in the war cannot be ruled out. While the escalation of the 
war would be costly, there is a high probability that Putin will not 
give up easily given his character and power. The Russo-Ukrainian war 
may escalate beyond the scope and region of Ukraine, and may even 
include the possibility of a nuclear strike. Once this happens, the U.S. 
and Europe cannot stay aloof from the conflict, thus triggering a world 
war or even a nuclear war. The result would be a catastrophe for 
humanity and a showdown between the United States and Russia. This final 
confrontation, given that Russia’s military power is no match for 
NATO’s, would be even worse for Putin.

3.  Even if Russia manages to seize Ukraine in a desperate gamble, it is 
still a political hot potato. Russia would thereafter carry a heavy 
burden and become overwhelmed. Under such circumstances, no matter 
whether Volodymyr Zelensky is alive or not, Ukraine will most likely set 
up a government-in-exile to confront Russia in the long term. Russia 
will be subject both to Western sanctions and rebellion within the 
territory of Ukraine. The battle lines will be drawn very long. The 
domestic economy will be unsustainable and will eventually be dragged 
down. This period will not exceed a few years.

4. The political situation in Russia may change or be disintegrated at 
the hands of the West. After Putin’s blitzkrieg failed, the hope of 
Russia’s victory is slim and Western sanctions have reached an 
unprecedented degree. As people’s livelihoods are severely affected and 
as anti-war and anti-Putin forces gather, the possibility of a political 
mutiny in Russia cannot be ruled out. With Russia’s economy on the verge 
of collapse, it would be difficult for Putin to prop up the perilous 
situation even without the loss of the Russo-Ukrainian war. If Putin 
were to be ousted from power due to civil strife, coup d’état, or 
another reason, Russia would be even less likely to confront the West. 
It would surely succumb to the West, or even be further dismembered, and 
Russia’s status as a great power would come to an end.

II. Analysis of the Impact of Russo-Ukrainian war On International Landscape

1. The United States would regain leadership in the Western world, and 
the West would become more united. At present, public opinion believes 
that the Ukrainian war signifies a complete collapse of U.S. hegemony, 
but the war would in fact bring France and Germany, both of which wanted 
to break away from the U.S., back into the NATO defense framework, 
destroying Europe’s dream to achieve independent diplomacy and 
self-defense. Germany would greatly increase its military budget; 
Switzerland, Sweden, and other countries would abandon their neutrality. 
With Nord Stream 2 put on hold indefinitely, Europe’s reliance on US 
natural gas will inevitably increase. The US and Europe would form a 
closer community of shared future, and American leadership in the 
Western world will rebound.

2. The “Iron Curtain” would fall again not only from the Baltic Sea to 
the Black Sea, but also to the final confrontation between the 
Western-dominated camp and its competitors. The West will draw the line 
between democracies and authoritarian states, defining the divide with 
Russia as a struggle between democracy and dictatorship. The new Iron 
Curtain will no longer be drawn between the two camps of socialism and 
capitalism, nor will it be confined to the Cold War. It will be a 
life-and-death battle between those for and against Western democracy. 
The unity of the Western world under the Iron Curtain will have a siphon 
effect on other countries: the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy will be 
consolidated, and other countries like Japan will stick even closer to 
the U.S., which will form an unprecedentedly broad democratic united front.

3. The power of the West will grow significantly, NATO will continue to 
expand, and U.S. influence in the non-Western world will increase. After 
the Russo-Ukrainian War, no matter how Russia achieves its political 
transformation, it will greatly weaken the anti-Western forces in the 
world. The scene after the 1991 Soviet and Eastern upheavals may repeat 
itself: theories on “the end of ideology” may reappear, the resurgence 
of the third wave of democratization will lose momentum, and more third 
world countries will embrace the West. The West will possess more 
“hegemony” both in terms of military power and in terms of values and 
institutions, its hard power and soft power will reach new heights.

4. China will become more isolated under the established framework. For 
the above reasons, if China does not take proactive measures to respond, 
it will encounter further containment from the US and the West. Once 
Putin falls, the U.S. will no longer face two strategic competitors but 
only have to lock China in strategic containment. Europe will further 
cut itself off from China; Japan will become the anti-China vanguard; 
South Korea will further fall to the U.S.; Taiwan will join the 
anti-China chorus, and the rest of the world will have to choose sides 
under herd mentality. China will not only be militarily encircled by the 
U.S., NATO, the QUAD, and AUKUS, but also be challenged by Western 
values and systems.

III. China’s Strategic Choice

1. China cannot be tied to Putin and needs to be cut off as soon as 
possible. In the sense that an escalation of conflict between Russia and 
the West helps divert U.S. attention from China, China should rejoice 
with and even support Putin, but only if Russia does not fall. Being in 
the same boat with Putin will impact China should he lose power. Unless 
Putin can secure victory with China’s backing, a prospect which looks 
bleak at the moment, China does not have the clout to back Russia. The 
law of international politics says that there are “no eternal allies nor 
perpetual enemies,” but “our interests are eternal and perpetual.” Under 
current international circumstances, China can only proceed by 
safeguarding its own best interests, choosing the lesser of two evils, 
and unloading the burden of Russia as soon as possible. At present, it 
is estimated that there is still a window period of one or two weeks 
before China loses its wiggle room. China must act decisively.

2. China should avoid playing both sides in the same boat, give up being 
neutral, and choose the mainstream position in the world. At present, 
China has tried not to offend either side and walked a middle ground in 
its international statements and choices, including abstaining from the 
UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly votes. However, this 
position does not meet Russia’s needs, and it has infuriated Ukraine and 
its supporters as well as sympathizers, putting China on the wrong side 
of much of the world. In some cases, apparent neutrality is a sensible 
choice, but it does not apply to this war, where China has nothing to 
gain. Given that China has always advocated respect for national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, it can avoid further isolation 
only by standing with the majority of the countries in the world. This 
position is also conducive to the settlement of the Taiwan issue.

3. China should achieve the greatest possible strategic breakthrough and 
not be further isolated by the West. Cutting off from Putin and giving 
up neutrality will help build China’s international image and ease its 
relations with the U.S. and the West. Though difficult and requiring 
great wisdom, it is the best option for the future. The view that a 
geopolitical tussle in Europe triggered by the war in Ukraine will 
significantly delay the U.S. strategic shift from Europe to the 
Indo-Pacific region cannot be treated with excessive optimism. There are 
already voices in the U.S. that Europe is important, but China is more 
so, and the primary goal of the U.S. is to contain China from becoming 
the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region. Under such circumstances, 
China’s top priority is to make appropriate strategic adjustments 
accordingly, to change the hostile American attitudes towards China, and 
to save itself from isolation. The bottom line is to prevent the U.S. 
and the West from imposing joint sanctions on China.

4. China should prevent the outbreak of world wars and nuclear wars and 
make irreplaceable contributions to world peace. As Putin has explicitly 
requested Russia’s strategic deterrent forces to enter a state of 
special combat readiness, the Russo-Ukrainian war may spiral out of 
control. A just cause attracts much support; an unjust one finds little. 
If Russia instigates a world war or even a nuclear war, it will surely 
risk the world’s turmoil. To demonstrate China’s role as a responsible 
major power, China not only cannot stand with Putin, but also should 
take concrete actions to prevent Putin’s possible adventures. China is 
the only country in the world with this capability, and it must give 
full play to this unique advantage. Putin’s departure from China’s 
support will most likely end the war, or at least not dare to escalate 
the war. As a result, China will surely win widespread international 
praise for maintaining world peace, which may help China prevent 
isolation but also find an opportunity to improve its relations with the 
United States and the West.




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