Pit Schultz on Sat, 5 Oct 96 23:21 MET |
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nettime: Sociotronics - Oliver Marchart |
Settlers, Indians, and the Cavalry or How to Subvert Electronic Identities by Oliver Marchart sociotronics In his essay ÎFinding as Foundingâ Stanley Cavell asks himself why this new America is said by Emerson to be yet unapproachable. Then he gives a range of possible answers starting with the following, in my view the most striking one: ÎFirst,â he says Îit is unapproachable if he (or whoever belongs there) is already there (always already), but unable to experience it, hence to know or tell it; or unable to tell it, hence to experience it.â (Cavell, 1989: 91) Stanley Cavell touches with this passage at something we could call the logics of the always already, which is central in any meaningful conceptualization of the discovery of new continents. But first let me give you the main question that is going to lead the line of my argument in this paper. How can we reactivate the subversive or emancipatory potential, if there is one, of cyberspace resp. electronic networks (I will use these two terms synonymously in this context). I will give you my answer to this question right at the beginning: In order to reactivate this political potential we have to overcome the illusionary perception of the medium as something with a pregiven essence in itself, a natural being of its own. Media don«t have natural charateristics that determine our perception of them. It«s the other way around: it is our construction that determines the nature of the medium. But there is a certain approach to media, a rhetoric of immediacy that claims that we just have to find out certain pregiven characteristics of electronic networks. Such an approach denies the fact that the medium is nothing else than Îthe place between the phonesâ, which is the definition of cyberspace by Bruce Sterling (Sterling, 1993: xi), and it is characterized by confusing narratives about electronic networks with supposedly Îrealâ qualities or properties of electronic networks. But these qualities are nothing else than the result of a narrative construction that in the case of electronic networks has quite a lot in common with so called ÎNew World Narrativesâ. That«s why we can call Cyberspace a new yet anapproachable continent. The discovery of new continents always leads to the repetitive projection of old myths on their white surface. What we discover doesn«t belong to the surface as such. It is our occidental imaginary that is projected onto these continents: India, China, Australia, America, Cyburbia. In this sense it is perfectly clear that the electronic networks partly represent a new America: an always receding horizon/frontier which has to be discovered and at the same time protected in its untouched innocent state. Or to put it more technically: amongst other narratives there are many new world narratives employed in order to constitute a social image of electronic networks and amongst these narratives the American narrative is predominant. Hence, it won«t surprise that we can observe the revival of social roles/characters/ personae such as that of the cowboy (console cowboy is the term Gibson uses in his novels for his cyberpunks), anarchists and terrorists (hackers, cypherpunks), liberals (the EFF), Indians (maybe us - after the commercial conquistadores have taken over) or the United States Cavalry (NSA). But we have to be careful: The matrix doesn't serve as a screen for the psychotic obsessions of some individuals but as a screen for our occidental imaginary, which has always been projecting its own myths onto newly discovered continents. This is not the first time in history. These social fantasies, respectively their incarnation or casting, is what I call the sociotronics of Cyberspace. So sociotronics primarily and simply designates the realm of the social in electronic media, the on-line-social. And this social is constructed through repetitive narration, exactly the same way as the off-line-social is constructed. The level of popular narratives is entangled with the level of high-brow fantasies of the social such as the ideas of political philosophers. Under the surface of popular imagination there are many vague ideas and patterns of political philosophy returning. Classical attitudes towards the question of society and community. An example: Whilst a ÎRousseauianâ faction seeks to protect the matrix as one would protect an untouched rural happyland, there is also a liberal faction seeking to institutionalize rights (ÎCyberrights Nowâ), which presupposes either a Lockean right to resist or a Hobbesian state of nature which has to be shaped by an electronic social contract. However, the thesis of my second and much shorter part will be that one should not stop at this level of sociotronics but rather point out that it«s just the outcome of pre-cyberspatial sedimented practices transfered into cyberspace (and therefore carrying along unpleasant features of western metaphysics, such as phallogocentrism etc.). Given the highly eurocentric perception of this space as a new continent to be colonized - its being part of colonial discourse - the question now will be how to liberate cyberspace from these imports. What is needed (as one task of an e-subversive program or manifesto) therefore is to overcome sociotronics and arrive at electronic politics; politics in a very specific sense: meaning the reactualization of the political potential of sedimented social myths and identities. It remains to be seen how fruitful it can be to translate the discussions on strategic identity, parodic repetition, radical difference and so on into the realm of electronic networks. discursivity and narrativity Now the time has come for some conceptual processing. What does it mean to say that many studies in media theory belong to the genre of New World Narratives. First we have to distinguish between discourse and narratives since they are always likely to be confused. A discourse or a signifying system - and this is something discourse analysis tells us - is structured around a binary opposition that serves as its organizing principle. A narrative is structured around binary oppositions as well, since it is part of a larger discourse, but furthermore it is filled up with sedimented patterns of action (story-patterns), making a highly Înaturalizedâ impression. The new right discourse on race and sexuality for example, which Anna Marie Smith has analyzed so masterly is composed of a whole bunch of narratives (Smith 1994). On the one hand we have the Thatcherite and Powellite discourse that is unified by means of negation - negation of something different to this discourse - (specifically the negation of black immigrants and homosexuals.) But on the other hand this discourse combines many narratives much older than Thatcherism which can serve the discourse as hosts, the same way as classical antijudaist narratives entered the discourse of modern antisemitism. (for example the ÎAnderl vom Rinnâ, the story of a child ritually killed by jews) The story of jews killing a christian child and even eating it is a specification of the pattern of people eating children and goes back at least to the myth of Chronos. But the specific meaning it transports at different times and different places arises out of the discursive context of this narrative pattern of incorporation. On the other hand the fact that cyberspace is created via narration has nothing to do with the vacuum-paradigm of cyberspace, that presupposes subjects without predicates - the so called Îcues filtered outâ approach. This vacuum paradigm about disembodiment is supposed to allow an open reinvention of the self. These ideas of for example unproblematic identity-switching and so on are embedded in a rhetoric of self-creation and self-invention based on the assumption of a voluntarist subject, that is - in my definition of the word - a subject that sets and defines the conditions of its own possibility. In my view such a voluntarist subject doesn«t exist, nobody defines at will the conditions of his or her possibility, not even in electronic networks. alterity and the always-already One reason why there is no open reinvention of the self is that the white surface of the new continent is just a logicaly necessary assumption but you will never encounter a white surface in reality. Because something is already there. And the analysis of older New World Narratives shows one interesting phenomenon: What you discover is always your own image in a reversed form. This sentence - since obviously it paraphrases the Lacanian communication formula - has an axiomatic status. Wherever you go, and here I take up Cavell, you are always already there. This means: Although the Sumo-wrestlers in Nintendo games are intruduced at a moment in time that is anterior and exterior to their incorporation into occidental american narratives, at the very moment as we discover them in the Nintendo play they are already part of our own culture, part of ourselves, they are not anymore Japanese in a strong sense. Since as long as they belong to the other«s culture we can«t perceive them at all. In this sense for us the original Îexoticâ Sumo-wrestlers would have the status of a Kantian Ding-an.sich. Speaking about Îthe otherâ from an ontological viewpoint therefore makes only sense as far as we mean a radical other. And in this case we can«t say anything about it. In all the other cases we don«t speak about the other - in any meaningful sense of the word - but about parts of ourself: that is to say, we speak about the same. My point here is that alterity always means radical alterity or it means no alterity at all. The consequences are clear: The New World is always already the old one in a reversed form. The other you discover is always already the same in a reversed form. There is no way of grasping the radical other, because as soon as you manage grasping it, it immediately becomes part of your own. However, this process of discovering something that is already there is not boring. Quite on the contrary: it is fascinating, for it tells you some truths about yourself. Probably at this point we come near to an explanation of our fascination in confronting cyberspace. Again, let us approach this fascination problem by means of an off-line example. What was the reason for the fascination Western spectators felt witnessing the ÎRevolutions of 1989â in Eastern Europe. Jeliza Sumic-Riha and Rado Riha argue that the Western spectators recognized the truth of these events Îto be a return to the origins of democratic experience, that is, to the extent to which these events were seen to constitute an answer - one already realized in the West - to the fundamental question of democracy. The West thus saw in the East the confirmation of its own truth. But it saw its own truth in a very specific way.â (Riha and Sumic, 1994:147) An answer already realized in the West: the answer was democracy. But it was not simply the reinvention of democracy that fascinated the West. It was the very fascination of the East that fascinated the West. The West was fascinated by the fascination Eastern European actors felt towards Western democracy - Îtheir naive belief in - Western democracyâ (Riha and Sumic, 1994:147). Does this help us in understanding our fascination with new worlds. Maybe it is the very fascination that belongs to the other, the eyes of the natives staring at us, their mouth wide open, that fascinates us. Is the fascination of the colonizer or the explorer result of the fascination of the discovered themselves who take the explorers for gods? A cunclusion that seems to me inherent to the approach of Jeliza Sumic and Rado Riha. Or should we go even one step further and claim that what fascinates most is not the encounter with a radical alterity but with the same (sameness), with oneself. There is only one experience that is more disturbing then to realize that I am not identical with myself - there is another one instead of me - and this even more disturbing experience is to discover that the other one is me. We can detect these two settings in horror stories or movies, where finding a double - a ÎDoppelgŠngerâ - is surely more frightening than simply loosing my identity or having the need for an exorcism, since someone else has taken over my body, although this might be an unpleasant experience as well. So I propose that at least one source of fascination may lie in the discovery of something we already know (why else should we be so fascinated by cyber-cafŽs or cities, electronic highways, piazze virtuale). How amazing it is that we discover Îsocietyâ at a place where we would have expected bits and bytes. So my thesis is that to a certain extent people are puzzled by cyberspace not because it«s totally opposed to real world but because it«s exactly the same as real world. There is an entire genre of stories1- humourist or tragical of their nature - playing exactly with this idea. I give you an example. Some explorers land on an unknown tropical island and what they expect is either only some primitive uncivilized natives or no people at all. But as they cross the island they discover a Club MediterranŽe or something. Civilization is already there, that«s the message. A stronger well-known version of these settings is the following: some castaways are starving to death, whilst the next city lies just behind the next dune. The messages of this kind of popular narratives can be diverse, but one of them - especially concerning the first version of the story - clearly is: it is illusionary to think you could escape civilization2. Civilization is always already around the corner, even if nobody knows. (However, you can starve to death right in the centre of civilization). Every Never-Never-Land is an Always-Already-Land. water/land/frontier: some discourse analytical observations Now we should have a look at the discursive mechanism of constructing new world narratives. I think we will discover three different functions. One highly prominent concept is the notion of frontier (Electronic Frontier Foundation and so on). We can speculate a lot about what`s lying behind this notion in the context of electronic networking. Mary Fuller for example speculates that Îthe drive behind the rhetoric of virtual reality as a New