<nettime> more replies on domain names

[Phil Agre <pagre@weber.ucsd.edu>]

[I have enclosed Dave Crocker's reply to Gordon Cook, along with the
comments on domain naming that Tony Rutkowski submitted to the NTIA.
I have taken the liberty of reformatting both messages to 70 columns.
See also http://www.flywheel.com/ircw/gpsubmit.html ] 

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Date: Wed, 25 Mar 1998 08:49:22 -0800
From: Dave Crocker <dcrocker@brandenburg.com>
Subject: Re: Gordon Cook reply to EFF on domain names

(My own comments submitted on the Green Paper are located at
<http://www.brandenburg.com/misc/ntia-bburg.html>.)

With respect to Gordon Cooks's note forcefully criticizing the
EFF's evaluation of the US government's Green Paper on Internet
administration, we see an excellent exemplar of the pattern that
has tended to dominate this topic.  As in any debate, an important
requirement is to assess the competencies and goals of those taking
the different sides.

With respect to Internet administration, we tend to see those
with significant, hands-on experience believing that the existing
administrative authority (IANA) has and does work well, only needing
continuing evolution to match changes in the Internet.  Hence they
believe that such evolution should be performed by and through IANA,
rather than through US government intervention.  Those making such
comments usually have enough operations background to discern the
considerable deficiencies in NSI's performance over the course of
its contract and, therefore, consider it an excellent demonstration
of the need to prevent for-profit registry (data base) administration.

Claims that IANA has lost the confidence of the Internet community has
no operational basis, since those administering the Internet continue
to work under the authority and guidance of IANA.

Concerning the detail of Gordon's comments:

At 10:58 PM 3/24/98 -0800, Gordon Cook wrote:
>Cook:  Anyone who expends the intellectual effort to read the Green Paper
>and various other filings should realize that this is a false statement.
>NSI is having a permanent monopoly over nothing.  If EFF means complain
>that the US government will not expropriate the business that NSI built up

In fact the GP does permit NSI to retain permanent, unregulated
control over the com/net/org data base and to operate it on a
for-profit basis.  The idea that separating the data base operations
into one part of the corporation and the front-end sales and service
(competing) registrar function into another will somehow prevent
NSI from using its special leverage sits somewhere between silly and
absurd.  The strongly dominant view is that data base operations need
to rest in the hands of NOT-for-profit entities that are subject to
meaningful public oversight.

I should also note the rather strange view that NSI somehow "built up"
its business.  Yes, the rate of registrations grew, but is this really
due to NSI?  We need to remember that NSI did not create the business,
did not fund it and did not market it.  All they did was administer
it under a US government contract and at the direction of IANA.  The
appeal of com/net/org is not predominantly the excellence (or lack)
of NSI's administration but the fact that those top-level domains have
the cachet of "global citizenship".  I've seen billboards in Italy and
Malaysia for companies using domain names from these gTLDs, yet the
companies were clearly and only doing local business.  NSI is in no
way responsible for this phenomenon.  It is part and parcel with the
Internet's growth and its culture.

>in .com - that is correct.  But is NSI allows others to register into .com
>that is in no way a permanent monopoly!

Since this point is confused so frequently by so many, it is worth
repeating the nature of the misunderstanding and the nature of the GP
proposal.

Registration can distinguish a front-end sales and service function,
performed by a registrar, and a back-end, data-base registry function.
For the Domain Name Service, the back-end registry function must be
performed by a single entity, for each "level" in the DNS hierarchy.
For each top-level domain name, there must be a single mechanism
in charge of doing the actual data base updates, in order to ensure
uniqueness and arbitrate competition.  When those vying for names are
competing in terms of business, the single mechanism must be a single,
separate organization.  In other words, competition among those
doing the vying needs a neutral third-party to enforce fairness and
ensure uniqueness.  It is widely accepted that there can and should
be multiple, competing registrars for the generic top-level domains.

If one of the registrars has a special, inside track to the operator
of the registry, they are certain to exploit it, since their goal is
to maximize profits.  The Green Paper permits exactly this unfortunate
opportunity for NSI/SAIC.  It permits the com/net/org registry to be
owned and operated by the same corporate tree that will be a registrar
for com/net/org.  No amount of theoretical separation within the
tree can guarantee fair treatment for the other registrars.  The only
way to ensure fairness is to establish the registry operations with
an entity that has no ties to NSI/SAIC.  The one exception to this
requirement is if the entity has equal ties to all its registrars.
An example of this is the Council of Registrars registry defined for
the gTLD Memorandum of Understanding, which operates as a consortium
of the registrars, and with public oversight from the POC (and PAB).

>EFF: EFF believes that the National Science Foundation (NSF) made a mistake
>by failing to control this for-profit company to protect the public
>interest.
>
>Cook:  Anyone who reads the public record will see that the NSF acted
>perfectly properly.  EFF had better make clear what its definition of the

Quite the contrary.  NSI has been operating without any meaningful
oversight.  Their charging scheme included a $15/year surcharge which
is increasingly being viewed as an illegal tax.  Further, the $35/year
service fee is repeatedly evaluated as being between 5 and 35 times
higher than necessary to recover operating costs.  For registration
renewal, the fee may be as much or more than 70 times too high.  NSI
claims otherwise, of course, but then NSI started doing this job when
it had none of the relevant technical or operational skills and it has
been learning as it has been developing.

With respect to NSF, the error they made was in having a small, closed
review process for the charging and the reviewing was done by people
who also lacked the relevant technical and operational expertise.

>extended to them in the future management of the domain name system. They
>made a deliberate, intentional and ongoing attempt to steal from the public
>the resource they had a five-year stewardship contract to manage and
>protect.
>
>Cook:  An absolutely outrageous statementŠ.especially the last sentence.

Strong, yes, but not outrageous.  NSI has claimed ownership over a
data base it did not create and whose development and operation it
did not fund.  It has billing practises which include providing its
customers with no verification or correlation of payment.  It is known
to double-bill with some regularity and to suspend entries erroneously
with some regularity.  It has a dispute policy which makes NSI an
evaluator of the dispute and is widely acknowledged to be not simply
unfair but astonishingly unfair.  And so on...

Independent of all of these historical negatives is the simple and
compelling fact that for-profit control of a DNS top-level registry
is entirely contrary to the best interests of Internet users.  It will
result in their being captive to the operator of the registry.  As is
the goal of all for-profit organizations, the registry will seek to
maximize profits; control over the customer will permit doing that to
excess.

>Only the MOUvement, which I believe has now discredited itself in front of
>a majority of Internet users, uses language designed to give Internet

On the contrary, the list of supporting signatories continues to grow.
One registrar has backed out, considerably after the USG government's
intervention clouded the process and ensured substantial delays.
(What is amazing to me is that only one has backed out.)  The list of
statements supporting the gTLD MoU, submitted in response to the Green
Paper has been substantial.  Best of all is the amount of material the
Green Paper, itself, took from the gTLD MoU work, although of course
it made no such attribution.

>management to the contol of the International Telecommunication Union.  But

This ITU bogeyman is getting tiresome, since it has no foundation in
fact.  It has wonderful emotional appeal, given the ITU's unfortunate
and unpleasant history with respect to the Internet, but relies
entirely on old history.  It is patently wrong with respect to current
ITU history and it is patently wrong with respect to the nature and
degree of ITU "power" over the gTLD MoU work.  The ITU has been a
highly constructive participant-among-equals in the gTLD MoU work.
They have been playing the Internet game according to Internet rules.
(And by the way, that's more than NSI can claim.)  Further, the claim
of ITU dominance is quite simply an insult to the many other people
and organizations that have provided input, leadership and support for
the gTLD MoU work.

>Cook:  Would it be too troublesome to ask EFF board members how they
>propose to replace the infrastructure built up by NSI and legitimately
>owned by NSI?  Infrastructure capable of handling 50,000 help phone calls
>per month and registering 120000 new .com domains.  EFF is proposing action
>here that if implemented would be disastrous for nearly 2 million current
>.com registrants.  Action that someone would have to pay for while

This line of criticism suggests a deep misunderstanding of some
fundamental points:

First, let's again distinguish the sales/support registrar function
from the registry data-base service.  The 50,000 phone calls pertains
to the former.  The 120,000 registrations pertains to the latter.
It turns out that the registration data base transaction rate is
about 12 per minute.  Modern transaction system can easily handle
100 per SECOND.  In other words, the technology to perform the data
base work is trivial, when developed by someone knowledgeable in that
technology.  The work done by Emergent, for CORE, is a prime example.

Replacing such work costs money, but not an outrageous amount.
Further we need to remember that NSI's investment was funded entirely
by the US government and by its users.  It made no independent
investments, no matter how their bookkeeping might claim otherwise.

With respect to the 50,000 customer calls, NSI is fully expected to
be permitted to continue a as a registrar.  If they are that good at
customer support, their investment and responsiveness will prove to
their advantage.

>conveniently omitting to say who.  Or has John Gilmore promised to foot the
>bill?  Besides not only do you need to have someone pay for it, it needs to

CORE has already been footing the bill and has developed a system that
is more efficient and more flexible and more powerful than the NSI
system.  It could fold in the com/net/org data base without breaking
into a sweat.  And please note that the CORE data base really WAS
developed with private, speculative investment funds from the
registrars, unlike NSI's source of public funding.

>be up and working before one can claim it as an alternative.  EFF could
>have done its home work.  It chose not to.  A shame.

Yes, not doing homework is indeed a shame...

>EFF:  We were happy to see that the DoC proposal requires Network Solutions
>to give the U.S. government copies and documentation of all data, software
...
>Cook:  Shame on any organization that ostensibly is dedicated to the
>preservation of civil liberties in cyberspace not recognizing the privacy
>implications of what they are proposing.  The irrational hatred of NSI
>expressed by this document they remind me strongly of the views of John

This sort of ad hominem attack serve only to miss the point that
this data base is essential to the operation of the Internet
infrastructure.  The information which some claim is a matter of
privacy is for Internet operations.  The problems that ensue from
misbehaving DNS servers, when there is no way to contact those
responsible for the servers, has been long and well-documented.

>EFF: Network Solutions should be required to turn over all root servers
...
>Cook:  Absurd.  Also I believe that the assertion about the "difficulty of
>changing the set of globally known root server addresses," is technically

Well, let's see.  First NSI has used their physical control over the
A server as a political bargaining chit, in many private discussions
about the DNS resolution.  Second is a misunderstanding of the nature
of the difficulty in moving the set of root server IP addresses. 
The physical aspects of changing the official list is easy.  The
operations aspects of instantiating that change throughout the
Internet is problematic.  It can be done but takes time.

>EFF: Domain name registration and the generic top level domains themselves
...
>Cook: Are you aware that you are asking for this to fall under ITU purview?
>Are you aware of the incalculable dollar value of this to traditional
>telcos which will be put out of business if they don't slow down the spread

"Purview".  Whatever this is supposed to mean, the facts are that
ITU has no substantive control over this area.  The concern over the
telcos is even less relevant.

>Cook:  IANA's TSAR like implementation got us into this mess.  It is not
>the way out.  Traditional bottom up self regulation as expressed in the
>Open Root server coalition IS a solution compatible with Internet standards
>and culture.

Again, this suggests a basic lack of knowledge about the reality of
IANA operational style, in particular the consultative nature of its
decision processes.  It further misunderstands the largely piratical
methods of those who have pursued alternative root systems, under
a continuing and impressive range of names, and with impressive
organizational instability.

d/
________________________________________________________________________
Dave Crocker                Brandenburg Consulting       +1 408 246 8253
dcrocker@brandenburg.com      675 Spruce Drive       (f) +1 408 249 6205
www.brandenburg.com        Sunnyvale, CA 94086  USA


[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/130dftmail/03_23_98-5.htm]

Date: 3/23/98 3:41pm 
From: Tony Rutkowski <amr@ngi.org> 
Subject: Comments in Docket No. 980212036-8036-01 

Karen Rose 
NTIA 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
Washington, DC 20230 

Dear Ms. Rose, 

Please find below my comments in the above captioned proceeding. 
They are also attached as a Micosoft Word document. 

respectfully, 
/signed/ 
Anthony M. Rutkowski 

---------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Before the 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
Washington, DC 20230 

In the Matter of ) 
) 
IMPROVEMENT OF TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT ) Docket No.
980212036-8036-01 
OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES ) 


Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

Comments of Anthony M. Rutkowski 


[signed] 

Anthony M. Rutkowski 
NGI Associates 
13102 Weather Vane Way 
Herndon VA 20171 
USA 
mailto: amr@ngi.org 

Principal 

23 Mar 1998 

SUMMARY 

In general, the U.S. government in this matter is taking precisely
the right course. It has instituted a lawful process domestically,
sent the right messages internationally, and constructed an enduring, 
stable, open, industry-driven model and specifics for effecting these
Internet-related administrative responsibilities.

To the extent modifications are needed, it involves effecting a more
diverse representative structure - especially involving Internet
Service Providers and users - as well as avoiding the inclusion as of
right by secondary groups.

The proceeding and the associated "outreach" activities of U.S.
government officials are responsible and commendable actions in the
face of predatory, disinformative, and frequently abusive behavior on
the part of parties that attempt to assert themselves as representing
the "Internet community," as well as international organizations who
seek inappropriately to assert their jurisdiction and involvement in
the management of the millions of private networks, computer hosts
and applications that share their resources through the Internet
protocols.

The steady reasoned course outlined in the NPRM will serve the
Internet's development and growth - indeed the world - for decades to
come.

-------------------------------- break -------------------------------- 

Before the 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
Washington, DC 20230 

In the Matter of ) 
) 
IMPROVEMENT OF TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT ) Docket No.
980212036-8036-01 
OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES ) 


Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

Comments of Anthony M. Rutkowski 

1. Anthony M. Rutkowski respectfully submits comments in this
proceeding published at 63 Fed.Reg. 8825 (No. 34, Feb. 20, 1998).
His expertise is well known to the agency - as an engineer-lawyer with
more than 30 years experience and leadership in industry, government,
and academic institutions, as well as author of scores of articles
and numerous books.  He is currently the principle in the consulting
firm of NGI Associates with several Internet-related company clients
- none of whom are directly affected by the outcome of this proceeding
- and director of the Center for Next Generation Internet. He is also
on the boards of Internet-related organizations and publications, but
not speaking on their behalf. Full details are available at
<www.ngi.org/rutkowski/>.

--------------------------------------------------- 
PUBLIC TRUST MODELS ARE WHOLLY INAPPROPRIATE AND 
POTENTIALLY PERNICIOUS FOR INTERNET IDENTIFIERS 
--------------------------------------------------- 

2. At the outset, the subject matter of this NPRM deserves focus for
what it is, and is not. The Internet by definition and in practice
consists of millions of networks, computer hosts, and applications
overwhelmingly in private hands that have autonomously provided for
some degree of interconnection and sharing of those resources. It is
this self-organizing agglomeration that we all casually refer to as
the Internet.

3. There is a significant collective, general public interest in
assuring the continued operation and development of the Internet and
its applications. There is also a legacy role of the U.S. government
that has been well portrayed in the NPRM, and an array of intellectual
property and other legal issues. However, the identifiers associated
with the Internet's operation are not limited like radio spectrum, nor
are they used for the operation of public telecommunication networks.
They are simply created, administered, and published for those
operating and using the Internet.

4. Internet identifiers are therefore not "public" resources nor
should they be part of a "public trust" model. Our systems of law
domestically and internationally ascribe special meaning and effect to
those terms that bring them under governmental and intergovernmental
jurisdiction and made an inextricable part of many normative
provisions.  This is wholly inapposite here. Some parties -
particularly intergovernmental ones - have sought to ascribe public
resource and trust status to these identifiers. As the agency well
knows, such a result has significant, far reaching, and uncontrollable
effects that it has wisely eschewed. If it is necessary to create any
kind of model, it should be a shared private trust. Explicit treatment
of this matter in the subsequent Report and Order in the proceeding,
and in diverse intergovernmental and bilateral forums will be
necessary to effectively implement these policies internationally.

I. The Proposal 

A. The Coordinated Functions 

--------------------------------------------------- 
THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INDUSTRY-ORIENTED CORPORATION 
TO MANAGE IANA FUNCTIONS IS WELL-CRAFTED, LONG 
NEEDED, AND PATENTLY APPROPRIATE 
--------------------------------------------------- 

5. The creation of a new private-sector, industry-oriented corporation
as proposed in the NPRM is precisely on target. The existing Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) arrangements in which a DOD research
contractor and staff were tasked with these responsibilities has
long been divorced from the reality of a huge commercial Internet
infrastructure and marketplace.

6. The existing institutional arrangements and processes have been
closed, with no due process or records, with significant conflicts
of interest in evidence - yet remaining to be legally protected
and funded by the U.S. government. This has unfortunately also
contributed to an extensive period in which contract personnel,
various non-profit organizations, and the intergovernmental
organizations have sought to lay claim to these responsibilities and
craft their own self-serving arrangements.

--------------------------------------------------- 
SOME DETAILS OF SURROUNDING THE FORMATION OF THE 
NEW CORPORATION CREATE INAPPROPRIATE CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST OR OTHERWISE NEED ATTENTION 
--------------------------------------------------- 

7. The staff and staff arrangements for the new corporation should be
free from conflicts of interest that might give even the appearance
of impropriety. The IANA function is presently provided for the U.S.
Government under a significant sole-source contract to the University
of California Information Sciences Institute; and the employees
involved have direct, significant, and long-standing relationships
with various of the parties whose interests are very much involved in
decision making matters before the new corporation. Such a requirement
is not only good policy for an industry organization, it will be a
material requisite in minimizing subsequent litigation.

8. Although these ISI employees must necessarily be involved in any
transition to new arrangements, the actual secretariat of the new
corporation should either be outsourced by open, competitive bidding,
or staff hired as part of open hiring process. Any newly employed
contractor or staff should be not be affiliated in any way with
present or future organizations whose interests are affected by
matters before the new corporation.

9. Serious consideration should be given to creation of the new
IANA organization as a congressionally chartered corporation. Doing
so could provide additional stature and avoid any problems associated
with the authority of the Dept. of Commerce in directing the creation
of a corporation. Such action would need to be carefully described
to make it plain that such incorporation is simply a ministerial act
necessary under any jurisdiction, that the resulting corporation is a
private international organization, and is not intended to serve any
special U.S interests.

10. Further to the issue of operating as a private international
organization, the established corporation in its charter should
specify a requirement that the number of directors from any one
country cannot exceed fifth percent. In addition, the organization
should register with the Union of International Associations, effect
relationships with other international organizations, maintain
multilingual capabilities, and distribute the physical location
of secretariat components. It should maintain especially strong,
continuing communications with the national TLD registries world as
well as the Internet operational organizations.

11. The NPRM appropriately notes the extraordinary and growing
diversity of the "Internet community" so as to make the term
essentially meaningless.  Almost every organization that exists
can probably find some argument why it should be represented in
this IANA corporation. In addition, there is the problem of dealing
with fronts. For example, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB)
is by no means "representative" of any Internet technical community.
It is nothing more than an advisory committee of the small,
highly-conflicted party in this proceeding - the Internet Society -
which wholly maintains and controls the IAB to further the interests
of the Society and its Board members in this matter.

12. On the other hand, there are Internet stakeholders who are to a
significant degree affected by the NPRM and the ensuing activities
of the Corporation. In pursuit of a objectives of the NPRM, if not
legal sufficiency, the composition of the Board should be framed
entirely in terms of stakeholder groups rather than organizational
representatives.

13. The individual Board members should serve as individuals chosen
by stakeholder groups, not as representatives of organizations per
se.  The NPRM attempts to identify some of those groups, specifically
1) the existing IP number registries, 2) the IAB, 3) a name registry
association, 4) Internet users including non-commercial, not-for-profit
use of the Internet, individual end users, commercial users, including
trademark holders.

14. However, there are some glaring errors and omissions here. As
noted above, the IAB exists simply as an Internet Society advisory
committee.  The existing IP number registries are administrative
entities which are not themselves stakeholders. Conversely, the
most directly relevant stakeholders are missing entirely, namely
the several thousand Internet Service Providers. They are a large,
diverse, and rapidly growing community that have little involvement
or representation in older established Internet groups. Reference,
for example, the attendees at any recent ISP Conference (ISPCON).

15. If the Board of the new corporation is to be truly representative
of stakeholders - and thus minimize its risk of litigation - it
will need to more effectively balanced. Annex 1 identifies these
stakeholders, and is offered as a means of achieving better
identification of groups and a balance in the composition of the
board.

16. The NPRM objective of subjecting the new body to antitrust
liability is commendable and a very important precedent in
establishing a general model for future Internet-related industry
activities.

B. The Competitive Functions 

--------------------------------------------------- 
THE DIVERSIFIED REGISTRY-REGISTRAR MODEL IS 
APPROPRIATE - FOR ALL TOP LEVEL DOMAINS 
--------------------------------------------------- 

17. The NPRM's proffered Registry-Registar model that allows for
diverse imlementations is an approach that is both pragmatic and
should balance the needs for both stability and greater competition
at several levels.

18. The NPRM fails, however, to apply the model broadly enough. It
should apply to all top level domains, not just the ones the so-called
generic ones. Not only is there no reason not to apply the model to
all TLDs, but failure to do so is patently discriminatory.

19. These policies established both through this proceeding, as well
as the subsequent activities of the Corporation apply to the many
private networks, host computers, and applications interoperating
openly via the Internet Protocol - falling largely outside the normal
jurisdiction or exercise of authority by national authorities. As
noted above, these are private, not public, identifiers used in
conjunction with private systems. In addition, these national TLDs can
be readily conveyed by lease to anyone to be used for other purposes -
as has already occurred in the case of the .IO domain.  A private IANA
corporation should not be exhibiting discriminatory treatment among
any TLD groups.

C. The Creation of New gTLDs 

--------------------------------------------------- 
A PRUDENT, EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH IS APPROPRIATE 
--------------------------------------------------- 

20. The expansion of gTLDs at a deliberate and controlled pace is
appropriate to allow for evaluation of the impact of the new gTLDs
and well-reasoned evolution of the domain space. Although many
parties have asserted there is a significant demand, it many in fact
be minimal.  Continuing experience suggests that the preponderance
of U.S. domestic users prefer to find variants in the .COM or .ORG
domains much more preferable than any other domains. Thus the real
demand may in fact be far smaller than some have suggested.

21. On the other hand, given the self-organizing properties of the
Internet, it seems unfeasible to control in any kind of absolute
way, the emergence and use of new name systems. Parties of record
such as Image OnLine, Iperdome, AlterNIC, AURSC have long maintained
operational systems.  Others such as InternetOne have leased national
TLDs to provide new services.  Still others such as CORE and pgMedia
seek also to initiate services. All of these parties can provide
useful, diverse testbeds, that hopefully can be managed and studied
by the new Corporation - relying also on interested groups of experts
such as the ORSC and any new bodies that will evolve.

22. Additionally, as the standards for new applications and systems
begin to be used - such as the object models of the Open Management
Group (OMG), or mobile autonomous agents of the Foundation for
Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) - entirely new kinds of DNS
approaches and ontologies will be necessary. Proceeding with
flexibility and rapid adaptability cannot be underscored enough.

D. The Trademark Dilemma 

--------------------------------------------------- 
THE TRADEMARK DILEMMA IS A MINOR FACTOR - 
PRIMARILY IN THE U.S. - AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES 
PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM 
--------------------------------------------------- 

23. Domain names are used primarily for corporate identification
and branding in the United States. As the NPRM notes, remarkably
few disputes have arisen, and these have overwhelmingly been solved
among the parties, with litigation being very rarely necessary. Any
new requirements or process relating to trademark disputes should
be minimalist, and not encumber in any way the normal rapid issuance
of domain names.  Requiring registries to resolve disputes seems
inherently ill-suited to their orientation and skill sets.

24. Because the vast preponderance of existing and future generic
top level domain use is in the U.S. - and is likely to remain so
- the construction of arrangements so as to maximize any resulting
litigation in the U.S., seems highly desirable. The remarks of some
commenting parties - particularly outside the U.S. - on this matter
are especially disingenuous. In fact, the so-called generic TLDs
have long been regarded as de facto U.S.  domains, and eschewed in
preference to national domains on a large scale throughout the world.

25. To call for complex and unnecessary global processes outside
the U.S. to deal with what has primarily been a problem among U.S.
parties, is little more than a calculated attempt to impede the
rapid pace of Internet use and assimilation in the U.S. The general
principles on these matters set forth in the NPRM - including the
minimal procedures in Appendix 2 and the proposed study - are the
right steps, and any new encumbrances should be weighed carefully.

E. The Intellectual Infrastructure Fund 

--------------------------------------------------- 
RECENT DECISIONS HAVE MADE THIS MATTER MOOT 
--------------------------------------------------- 

26. The recent abolishment of the fund and the collection of monies by
the National Science Foundation has made this subject moot.

II. The Transition 

A. The NSI Agreement 

--------------------------------------------------- 
THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO NSI 
UNDER THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT ARE EXCELLENT 
--------------------------------------------------- 

27. The proposed transition arrangements with respect to NSI under the
NSF cooperative are equitable and serve the interests of all parties
concerned.

B. Competitive Registries, Registrars, and the Addition of New gTLDs 
(ref. App 1) 

--------------------------------------------------- 
THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO A 
TRANSITION ARRANGEMENT OF FIVE NEW TLDS WITH 
ONE PER REGISTRY PROVIDER ARE EXCELLENT, BUT 
SHOULD ALSO BE APPLIED TO NATIONAL REGISTRIES 
--------------------------------------------------- 

28. The proposals to introduce additional competition during the
transition period are measured and appropriate. However they should
also be applied to national registries for the reasons outlined in
para. 19, above. Pioneer preferences seem appropriate.

C. The Root Server System 

--------------------------------------------------- 
THE ROOT SERVER SYSTEM SHOULD REVIEWED AND 
TRANSITIONED AMONG THE INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS 
RATHER THAN SECONDARY PARTIES 
--------------------------------------------------- 

29. The root server system operation is properly a matter for the U.S.
government, its management contractors including ISI and NSI, existing
root server operators, and major Internet Service Providers. This
should be coordinated by all these parties cooperating together to
assure a robust, secure, and performant system. It should not involve
outside interests such as technical society advisory committees -
which is wholly inappropriate.

D. The .us Domain 

--------------------------------------------------- 
TRANSFERRING THE .US DOMAIN TO AN MOTIVATED 
INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION UNDER APPROPRIATE 
SAFEGUARDS IS HIGHLY BENEFICIAL AND LONG OVERDUE 
--------------------------------------------------- 

30. The assignment of the .US domain by the government's IANA function
contractor - ISI - to itself to undertake other government specialty
contracts was an inappropriate and ill-advised action at best.
It has long been recognized that transferral of this function to an
appropriate industry body - either for-profit or non-profit - under
appropriate safeguards would be highly useful to an enormous number
of U.S. users. As the NPRM notes, however, the current administrative
arrangements are far too cumbersome.  The matter deserves urgent
attention, and could be easily effected during the transition period.

31. There is no reason whatsoever to move .GOV and .MIL users under a
.US domain. This is a wholly unnecessary and costly undertaking. Those
two domains can simply be recognized and administered as de facto U.S.
domains as has long been the case.

E. The Process 

--------------------------------------------------- 
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ARTICULATED PRINCIPLES AND 
ROLE IN THE TRANSITION PROCESS ARE HIGHLY 
BENEFICIAL AND COMMENDABLE 
--------------------------------------------------- 

32. The U.S. government and the associated officials and staff
have played a highly positive and beneficial role with respect to
these important Internet administrative functions. The articulated
principles serve the interest of the public, industry, and the
world. This is a unique time of transition when important models
are being set for years to come.

33. The administration of Internet-related identifiers is potentially
subject to significant anticompetitive abuse, as well as arbitrary
behavior and personal favoritism. It inherently arises no matter how
well intentioned the responsible staff or responsible officials. In
addition, with respect some of these identifiers such as domain names,
there may be important issues associated with freedom of expression.
Making this activity subject to antitrust, First Amendment, and tort
law of the Unites States provides an ideal check on wrongful behavior
by those undertaking this activity. It is also patently where the most
intense usage is occurring, and the support is likely to be efficient
and the costs comparatively low. If significant demand for these
services arises in different global regions, it is very easy to
distribute them as has already been done for IP addresses.


------------------------------------- break 
------------------------------------- 

Annex 1 
SIGNIFICANT PARTIES OF INTEREST 
INTERNET DOMAIN NAME SERVICES AND USE 

DIRECT PARTIES OF INTEREST 

O Providers 

Root Admin Services 
Existing (1) 
New entrants (TBD) 
Root Server Services 
Existing (13) 
New entrants (TBD) 
TLD Services 
Existing gTLD (4) 
Existing nTLD (~200) 
New entrants (TBD) 
Sub-TLD Services (~70,000) 
Registration intermediaries (?) 
BIND server software (~10) 
Registration software (?) 

O Users and Uses 

Internet Service Providers 
Web site builders 
Trademark owners 
End user 
Business identity 
Professional identity 
Individual identity 
Branding & marketing 
Free expression 
Object owners 
places 
mobile agents 
Governments 

INDIRECT PARTIES OF INTEREST 

O Other Industry 
O Service providers 
O Software vendors 
O Hardware vendors 
O Telecom providers 

O Public 
O Ordinary people 
(50 million +) 

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